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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Exploratory study on applying system thinking to
examine safety in Navy/ Coast Guard / Commercial
Shipping operations.
Degree:

Master of Science

The recent succession of warship collisions questioned the Navy capacity to
ensure safe navigation. This situation inspired this exploratory study of warship,
coast guard and commercial ship safety in operations. In this study, Systems
thinking is applied in the context of maritime safety. This novel research
emphasizes behaviour and purpose (finality). As the finality of a system is
deduced from its behaviour, the research differentiates allocated finality and
achieved finality. Indeed, safety first motto may in some cases be purely
rhetorical. To discuss this view, focus groups were organised and to benchmark
the findings, an interview with an Irradiated Nuclear Fuel ship expert was
conducted. The first findings show that warship, coast guard ship and commercial
ship operations cannot be strictly compared. Really, ownership and mission
allocation are major determinants in ship design and operation, and therefore, predetermine safety. The institutional framework and culture of navy, coast guard
and commercial shipping also affect ship safety practices. Due to the uniqueness
of each system of maritime operation, ready-made safety solutions could be
counter-productive if not properly adapted to the specificities and constraints of
each system. Any systemic alteration has to embrace the inherent limits and
resistance of any system to change.

KEYWORDS: Maritime, Systems thinking, Finality, Behaviour, Safety,
Accidents, Operations.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.0 Background of the Study
Maritime operations1 have always borne inherent risk of accidents. From the
ancient era of wooden ships to steel ships of the present, preventing accidents has
been a challenge in the operation of ships of all types and classification.
Generically, safety is the characteristic or attribute of a system, necessary and
sufficient to reduce the number of harmful events to crew, ships, organisations or
environment to an acceptably low level (Hollnagel, 2014). Therefore, to
effectively address safety, thinking should be organised in systems 2 approach.
Systems thinking “is a set of synergistic analytic skills used to improve the
capability of identifying and understanding systems, predicting their behaviours,
and devising modifications to them in order to produce desired effects” (Arnol &
Wade, 2015). The ability to think in systems is itself a system which creates a
behaviour pattern. The above definition and explanation of systems in glossary,
show that to understand and improve a system to achieve its purpose, it is
important to study its behaviour. Behaviour and purpose as key concepts are
applied to understand safety of systems in this research.

1

Maritime Operations are activities and actions conducted with the aim of achieving the purposes of
warships, CG ships and commercial ships. See Glossary for further description.
2
See Glossary for explanations of systems.
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The systems discussed in this research are Navy, Coast Guard (CG) and
commercial shipping organisations. Particularly, the respective subsystems3 of
these systems, which are warships, CG ships and commercial ships, will be
analysed due to the apparent rise in accidents involving these ships.

Since 2017, a worrying trend of warship accidents have occurred involving
Argentina, Chile, China, Germany, Italy, Taiwan, Norway and United States (US)
Navies (MAREX, 2017; Schkvarkin, 2018 Septemebr 26; Larter and Sprenger,
2018; Strong, 2019; Voytenko, 2018; Voytenko, 2019a; Stickings, 2019;
Voytenko, 2019b). Similarly, accidents have been recorded in CG ship operations
(NTSB/MAB-17/22, 2016; NTSB/MAB-17/37, 2017). These accidents have
raised concerns about warships, which are fitted with high-tech navigation
equipment and are supposed to be constantly alert (Bakhsh, 2018). To understand
this trend, there is a need for a closer look at maritime operations.
Five warships of the United States Navy 7th Fleet based in the Pacific, United
States Ship (USS) Antietam, USS Lake Chaplain, USS Fitzgerald, USS John
McCain and USS Benfold were involved in accidents between 2017 and 2018
(Navy Office of Information, 2017a; Navy Office of Information, 2017b,
Bateman, 2018). On 15 November, 2017 Argentinean Navy lost the submarine
San Juan, after its batteries caught fire (Rey, 2019). A German Navy Corvette,
Erfurt rammed a jetty “Tirpitz mole” at Kiel on 21 September 2018, with the
warship sustaining bow damages (Voytenko, 2018). On 8 November 2018, the
Norwegian Navy Frigate Kongelige Norske Marine (KNM) Helge Ingstad
collided with the Motor Tanker (MT) Sola TS and subsequently sank (AIBN,
2018). USS Leyte Gulf and United States Navy Ship (USNS) Robert E. Peary
collided on 5 February 2019 while conducting underway replenishment (LaGrone
& Eckstein, 2019). A Saudi Arabian tanker Sama on 8 March, 2019 ran into a
Taiwanese Frigate Ning Yang berthed in harbour, causing damage to the warship
3

See Glossary for description of subsystems.
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(Strong, 2019). On 8 May 2019, the Italian Frigate Federico Martinengo collided
with the Italian fishing vessel Sofia Fabio with both ships sustaining minor
damages (Voytenko, 2019a). On 1 August 2019, a Chinese warship suspected to
be the Lufang collided with a Taiwanese bulk carrier Youtai No. 1 (Stickings,
2019). Recently on 29 August 2019, an explosion on Chilean warship Sargento
Aldea during maintenance works led to crew injuries (Voytenko, 2019b). This
alarming trend highlights the need to review warship operations in order to
mitigate accidents.

CG ships show a similar accident trend. Recent collisions between United States
Coast Guard Cutter4 (USCGC) Thetis and towing vessel Matachin, and USCGC
Tampa and Tugboat Cerro Santiago also raised concerns, since CG ships are to
ensure safety of navigation (NTSB/MAB-17/22, 2016; NTSB/MAB-17/37,
2017). Though safety measures were taken by the USCGC the accidents still
occurred due to fatigue and improper lookout.

There have been many commercial ship accidents resulting in the loss of property
and damage to the environment (Butt, Johnson, Pike, Pryce-Roberts & Vigar,
2012). Commercial ship accidents still occur such as the collision between the MV
Ulysse and a ferry MV Virginia on 7 October 2018. On 12 March 2019, a fire
broke out on MV Grande America which later sank. The Viking Sky was in
distress when its engines failed while underway in bad weather on 23 March 2019
(MAREX, 2019; Jeffery, 2019). These instances show that accidents prevail in
commercial shipping and indicate the need for an in-depth study.

Several individual, governmental and international efforts in addressing shipping
accidents resulted from investigations of earlier accidents (Butt et al., 2012; JTSB,
2018). Investigations into the sinking of the Royal Mail Steamer (RMS) Titanic

4

See Glossary for definition of Cutter.
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and the consequent development of the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) led to
changes in maritime operations, making them safer (IMO, 1974; Cathey, 2017).
SOLAS and other regulations such as International Regulation for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (IRPCS) 1972, recommend measures for preventing collisions
and accidents (IMO, 1972). However, there is a need to approach safety differently
since shipping accidents are still prevalent.

A systemic approach is a potent one. The casualty investigation into the 2011
Deepwater Horizon disaster highlighted systemic failures in management of risk
as underlying causes (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill and Offshore Drilling [U.S.], 2011). Additionally, Leveson (2011) states that
“Safety is clearly an emergent property of systems and safety can only be
determined in the context of the whole”. The purpose of this work is to understand
the links and reciprocal influences between systems (i.e. Navy, CG and Shipping
Industry) and their dependent sub-system ships5.

1.1 Problem Statement
The annual increase in seaborne trade of about 4%, with a growing world
commercial ship fleet of over 93,161 ships, continues to constrict the maritime
space (UNCTAD, 2017). According to the Pennant List of IHS Jane’s Fighting
ships 2015/2016 yearbook, there were about 7369 warships and patrol crafts
across the world (Saunders, 2016). A similar list in the 2017/2018 edition of the
same publication indicated 7513 warships and patrol crafts (Saunders, 2017). The
number of warships and patrol crafts in the world has increased, which may be
due to increases in fleet sizes of emerging naval powers (e.g. China) (Mizokami,
2018a; Woody, 2018a; Military Factory, 2019). The occupancy of the maritime
domain by increasing numbers of ships and the multiplication of offshore

5

See Glossary for Definition of Sub-system ship.
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activities (e.g. wind-farms, oil and gas) has constricted the maritime space and
raised the probability of accidents.

Efforts to improve safety have focused on ship safety but have been oblivious to
the larger context of maritime operations, despite some attempts such as that of
the IMO in Shipping6 (ISM Code) (IMO, 2000). Warships, CG and Commercial
ships operate within such operational and administrative systems. These ships
could be seen as tools used to achieve the objectives (finality) of the systems. High
level control of subsystem-warship relies on policies, instructions and crew
performance to ensure goals are achieved. Crew performance is however
influenced by the training of seafarers as stipulated by Standards of Training
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW, 1978 as amended) (IMO, 1978). In
contrast, Navy and CG watchkeepers are largely trained and certified based on
standards set by the specific Navy or CG authority. Non-maritime focused training
such as staff officer qualification draws away from watchkeeping training (US
Navy, 2017a). This may limit the experience of watchkeepers.

Indeed, how warships or CG ships with relatively larger crew using high-tech
navigation equipment and commercial ships operating under strict safety
standards regulated by IMO can collide in open waters is difficult to comprehend.
Therefore, the research problem is to assess the influence of systems on the safe
operation of their respective subsystem-ships (warships, CG ships and commercial
ships) using system thinking. Due to the highlighted trend in warship accidents,
this exploratory research is inclined towards discussions on warship safety.

6

See Glossary for definition of Shipping.
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1.2 Dynamics of a Typical Maritime Operations Systems

Figure 1: Modified diagram of system by Baumler (2019) to represent the
dynamics of a Navy system. Source; Researcher.
Navy as a system is a collection of parts/elements/subsystems (warships, naval
bases, harbours, logistics bases, ship building yards) which are interrelated/
interconnected. A warship is an important subsystem (subsystem- warship7) of
system-Navy8. Both are viewed as open-systems/subsystems. The interconnected

7
8

See Glossary for definition of subsystem-warship.
See Glossary for definition of System-Navy.

17

parts/elements in a subsystem-warship (engines and machinery, navigational
equipment, weapons and weapon systems, rudders and propellers, crew, command
structure) interact with each other. These interactions create a coherent whole
producing a characteristic set of behaviour (war characteristics) to achieve an
objective/finality (Meadows, 2008).

Elements with similar interactions (crew members of the same ship) fall into a
subsystem while elements with dissimilar interactions (crew of a ship and an HQ
administrative staff) fall in different subsystems (Pomeroy & Sherwood, 2006;
Baumler, 2019). Subsystem-warships have a hard boundary since their boundaries
are the hull of a ship. Subsystem-warships are highly influenced by HQ (systems
control) inputs/decisions (policies, resources, instructions). They are also
influenced by the wider environment (economic challenges, political system, and
security situation) in which they are situated. These inputs and influences enable
warships to achieve objectives (finality) and also build a stock9. Ineffective
subsystem-warship administration or operation could lead to accidents. Further
subsystem-warship discussions are in Chapter Four.

1.3 Aims and Objectives
The aim of this research is to explore Navy, CG and Commercial shipping
operations with systems thinking to find trends and suggest ways to improve ship
safety, particularly in relation to warship operations. This research seeks to attain
the following objectives:


To analyse the conduct of maritime operations in sub-systems (warship,
CG and commercial ship) using the concepts of behaviour and finality.



To analyse recommendations in recent warship, CG and shipping
accident investigation reports to draw lessons which can be implemented
in the 3 categories of maritime operations.

9

See Glossary for definition of stock.
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To examine systems- (Navy, CG and Shipping) and identify the effect of
their respective context (economic, political, technical and ideological)
on safety of ship.



To suggests ways to improve the safety of warship, CG and commercial
ship operations.

1.4 Research Questions
The research mainly seeks to investigate how system thinking could unveil the
phenomenon of emergence and dynamics of safety in warship, CG and
commercial ship operations. The work seeks to confirm whether the current
conduct of maritime operations leads to the attainment of the allocated purpose
(finality) of subsystems-ship. The following sub-questions serve as guide in
answering the main research question:


How the finality of warship, CG and commercial ships influences ship
design and operation?



Which institutional framework/culture predisposes ships to accidents?



What are the strengths and weaknesses in warships, CG and commercial
ships operations when considered as sub-systems?

1.5 Research Methods
To answer these questions, suitable research methods were selected. The research
adopted qualitative methods of phenomenology, since it provides a means of indepth exploration into the experiences and views of individuals (experts) (Yuksel
& Yildirim, 2015). The individuals were selected based on their experience and
according to purposive sampling (Cresswell & Clark, 2011). Such in-depth study
of warship, CG and commercial ship safety in operations could reveal causes of
recent trend of accidents and enhance its avoidance. Qualitative methods which
seek to analyse phenomena and reveal details were preferentially selected instead
of quantitative methods that mainly involve gathering data to generalise a
phenomenon.
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1.5.1 Data Collection
Data was collected from primary and secondary sources. Phenomenological data
collections methods of focus groups and interviews were selected based on
effectiveness in answering the research question (Palmer, Larkin, Visser & Faden,
2010). As stated by O'Dwyer & Bernauer (2013), validity, reliability and meaning
were achieved through in-depth data collection, interpretation and thorough data
analysis.


Primary Data. The focus group used semi-structured questions. This gave
the participants (mostly maritime professionals) the leverage to contribute
and discuss the details of each subject to reveal insights. It also allowed
discussions to lead to emergent topics. Focus Groups enabled in-depth
exploratory study of the dynamics of safety in Navy, CG and Commercial
shipping industry. A semi-structured interview was conducted with an
expert in a mode of shipping with high safety standards (zero-accident
record). This served as a reference point for analysis and comparison of
safety of warship, CG and commercial ship operations.



Secondary Data. Literature on application of systems theory; behaviour
and purpose were reviewed. Finality and purposeful behaviour are
highlighted in the literature review. These concepts are considered in
Gestalt States, which means concepts in their whole functioning states
(Koffka, 1935). Gestalts are used in classifying the properties of systems.
Therefore, Gestalts of counterfinality and purposeful behaviour are subtly
used to classify qualities of systems (Navy, CG and shipping) (Florio,
2015; Sevaldson, 2017). The research investigates whether the conduct of
maritime operations (behaviour) seeks to attain the purpose (finality) of
the subsystem-ship. This was achieved through an analysis of the
organization and structure of subsystem-ship. The International Labour
Organisation (ILO) and IMO regulations were also reviewed to find useful
concepts on ship and crew safety standards. Some regulations reviewed
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were SOLAS, STCW and Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) 2006
(ILO, 2006).

1.5.2 Data Analysis
Participants were carefully selected to ensure useful contributions of ideas to this
research. The model of a high safety mode of shipping revealed the
interconnections and interactions of components in a comprehensive view. Data
was analysed to see if the goal of ships were achieved by their operation. This was
in line with Meadows’ (2008) view that “purposes are deduced from behaviour,
not from rhetoric or stated goals.” Additionally, Leveson’s (2011) matrix of four
control conditions was used in analysing ownership and mission of subsystemships.

1.5.3 Systemic Solutions
Systemic suggestions on ways of influencing change in safety, particularly for
warships, followed a 12 Factor approach proposed by Meadows (2008). The 12factors are leverage points in systems where a small influence could yield a large
change in behaviour.

1.6 Organisation of Research
The research is structured in five Chapters with five Appendices.


Chapter One gives an introduction to the whole topic highlighting the
problem statement, research aim and objectives and proposed research
methods.



Chapter Two gives a literature review and sets the theoretical basis for the
work. Systems concepts of finality and behaviour are critically analysed to
extract key concepts. Allocated and Achieved finality are also explored. A
visualization of the discussion and application of finality and behaviour in
this work is shown in Appendix 3.
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Chapter Three explains the methodology used in the research. It justifies
the choice of the qualitative method of phenomenology. It also explains
why data collections methods of focus group and interview were selected
as suitable methods for achieving the research aims and objectives. It
describes how the research work was planned, organised and executed.
Limitations of the research effort are stated.



Chapter Four analyses data collected, describes demographics of
participants, highlights presentation and coding of data. Data analysis
looks at the subsystem- ships according to ownership, mission, design and
construction, crewing and operations at sea. Emergent issues are discussed
in the context of safety.



Chapter Five concludes the research showing how the pre-defined aims
and objectives had been achieved. The Chapter gives suggestions for
improving in system safety, contribution of the research to knowledge is
stated and recommendation future research is made.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction to Safety Concepts
The concept of safety has shifted from one with mystic and religious origins
to one reliant on statistics, human decision making, and technology
(Berstein, 1998; Manuel, 2011). Safety is generically defined as a condition
with no accidents, incidents, near misses, or where the likelihood of these
occurring is low (Hollnagel, Wears & Braithwaite, 2015). The development
of safety has been reliant on technology and conceptual modelling. Heinrich
(1931) proposed the Domino model (earliest model) depicting accidents as
caused by a unique initiating event leading to the fall of other dominos
(failures). This is a sequential model of accident causation focusing on root
causes of accidents as depicted in Figure 2 (Hollnagel et al., 2015). To
satisfy the need for more complex linear systems (comprising latent and
active failures), Reasons (1990) developed the Swiss Cheese model, an
epidemiological model shown in Figure 3 (Hollnagel et al., 2015; Li,
Guldenmund & Aneziris, 2017).
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Figure 2: Linear/ Sequential models; Dominos in a series of failures and the
Energy model by Haddon, (1980).

Figure 3: Epidemiological models (Swiss cheese and Bow-tie models). Source:
Hollnagel, (2008) and Khan & Hashemi, (2018).

A shift in thinking from models with resultant outcomes to that of emergent
outcomes triggered systemic models. Accordingly, the definition of safety
changed from focusing on reducing negative events to one promoting positive
events (Safety I – Safety II) (Hollnagel, 2014; Schröder-Hinrichs, Praetorius,
Graziano, Kataria & Baldauf, 2015). Systemic models, such as Control theoretic
and Confidence models, view the function of organisation, technology, human,
and other elements as a whole (Hollnagel et al., 1999, 2015). Systems are therefore
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defined as collections of elements or parts of a whole coherently organized with
patterns of interconnection or structure that produce a characteristic set of
behaviour to achieve a purpose or finality (Meadows, 2008).

2.1 Review of Systems Theory
Classic scientific approaches generally followed the reductionist or divide and
conquer philosophy (Leveson, 2011). The reductionist approach to science and
problem solving involves breaking a whole entity into parts and addressing the
problem of each part in isolation from the whole. This approach assumes that parts
interact to produce a linear sum or predictable product. However, interaction
between parts may produce emergent properties which may not be a direct sum of
the parts (Meadows, 2008). As stated in Sufi teaching story “You think that
because you understand ‘one’ therefore you must understand ‘two’ because one
and one make two. But you forget that you must also understand ‘and’. Therefore,
a holistic (systems) approach would provide better understanding and control of
systems (Meadows 2008; Leveson, 2011; Caws, 2015). Furthermore, by
considering the context of the system a thorough understanding of its dynamics is
achieved.

Ludwig von Bertallanfy (1968) applied systems thinking in his pioneering work
in embryology and later mooted the concept of General Systems Theory (GST).
GST seeks a unification of science and its approaches in all fields (von
Bertallanfy, 1968). Systems theory has been applied by many scholars (Einstein,
1934; Koffka, 1935; Boulding, 1956; Katz and Kahn, 1978; Checkland, 1981;
Winter et al., 1995; Rapoport, 1997; Meadows, 2008; Levson, 2009; Kruglanski,
Köpetz, Bélanger, Chun, Orehek & Fishbach 2013; Sevaldson, 2017; Dauchot,
2018) in various fields (ecology, engineering, economics, anthropology,
sociology, psychology, geography and the natural sciences) (Currie & Galliers,
1999). Furthermore, Pomeroy and Jones (2006), applied systems approach in re-
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analysing 100 maritime accidents at sea to glean information on accident causal
factors and latent failures that may have been missed in earlier investigations.

Despite many applications, systems theory is yet to be applied in a study of
warship, CG and commercial ship accidents. This work fills that knowledge gap.
The seminal work by Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow (1943) on behaviour is the
point of departure of this research. A detailed discussion on behaviour follows in
the review of finality.

2.2 Review of Finality in Systems Thinking
Finality generally implies the purpose or goal(s) the system tends to achieve
through behaviour (Castelle, Baugh & Bradley, 2015). In the literature there are
variations of finality discussed as follows:


Equifinality: is the phenomenon of having multiple strategies leading to the
achievement of a specific purpose (Katz & Kahn, 1978; Skyttner, 2005;
Castelle, Baugh and Bradley, 2015). In embryology, the development of a
normal organism from a whole ovum or fused ova is a classic example.
Different initial sizes and courses of growth in organisms could result in the
same ultimate size organism (Waddington, 1957; von Bertalanffy, 1968;
Zelazo, 2013).



Multifinality: is the phenomenon of one particular strategy or action yielding
different purposes (Castelle, Baugh & Bradley, 2015). Kruglanski et al.,
(2013), describe multifinality as one behaviour achieving multiple goals. The
singular act of writing this review may seek to present an objective argument,
impress the reader and defend an opinion (Kruglanski et al., 2013).



Counterfinality: is a phenomenon or event that negates/invalidates another
event from achieving its end state (Turner, 2014). This concept has vast
potential in understanding socio-technical systems such as shipping, which
while stating “Safety First” has relatively poor safety standards. Radar was
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introduced on ships to assist navigators in avoiding collisions. However, overreliance on Radar without applying time-tested navigational skills resulted in
collisions leading to the coining of the term Radar-assisted collisions (Lee &
Park, 2009; Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel & Baldauf, 2012; Halpern, 2015).
It is necessary to investigate the reciprocal link between behaviour and purpose
(finality), highlighting behaviour as a determinant of finality.

2.2.1 Behaviour of Systems
Behaviour means any change of an entity with respect to its surroundings
(Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow, 1943). Aptly, behaviour is defined in four
cardinal views:


Firstly, as the occurrence of an organism’s action, inaction or reaction.



Secondly, as a class of pattern of actions.



Thirdly, as group behavior.



Finally, as a change or movement of an object (Lazzeri, 2014).

Moreover, behaviour is an emergent property of systems that includes
adaptiveness,

goal-seeking,

resilience,

self-organisation or

evolutionary

behaviour. Therefore, behaviour can be considered as a result of system functions
and objectives (purpose, finality, teleology10, goals). Behaviour can, therefore, be
based on system inter-relations and interactions.

2.2.2 Classification of Behaviour
Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow (1943), in their further works on behaviour,
make distinctions in behaviour of systems focusing on attributes such as active,
purposeful, feedback controlled and predictive behaviour. This is shown in Figure
4.

10

Fundamentally, Teleology is different from Finality. Teleology refers to a
feedback driven purpose which leads to Finality as the ultimate end-state.
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Figure 4: Adapted from Bias Pathway in Behaviour Description (Source:
Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow, 1943).

At lowest/first level, behaviour can be active or passive. Active behaviour means
the object drives behaviour based on its energy, while in passive behaviour the
object does not drive behaviour.
At the second level, Active behaviour can be divided into purposeless and
purposeful active behaviour. Purposeful behaviour is the action of behaviour
directed towards achievement of a goal (Mandl, 2019), while purposeless
behaviour is not directed toward a goal. The concept of purposeful behaviour is
supported by Castelle, Baugh & Bradley (2015) in their work on system axioms.
They described purposeful behaviour as the tendency exhibited by systems in
seeking goals. A more recent study of purposeful behaviour by Axelsson (2019)
viewed it in the context of ecological validity. The study considered the
environment to be as important as the organism under study. Therefore, both have
to be studied concurrently in order to understand the behaviour of the organism.
This joins Brunswick’s (1952, 1955) claim that behaviours are probabilistic
because the environment is non-deterministic.
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At the third level, it is suggested that Purposeful behaviour may be feed-back
driven (teleological) and non-feedback driven (non-teleological) (Rosenblueth,
Wiener & Bigelow, 1943):


Non-Feedback behaviour means no signal is captured to adjust behaviour.



Feedback behaviour means that the studied system collects information on
its behaviour to adjust it accordingly. For example, the continuous
monitoring of ship’s position is a feedback loop because it leads the
Officer of the Watch (OOW) to adjust the ship’s heading according to
deviation from the expected route. Figure 5 shows a simple feedback
system.

Figure 5: Model of an open system with a feedback loop.

At the fourth level, behaviour is Purposeful, Feedback driven and predictive. It
means such behaviour exhibits predictive tendencies which could be divided into
orders depending on the ability of the system to predict events.
At fifth level, Predictive behaviour requires the manipulation of a minimum of
two coordinates; one being temporal with the other spatial. This capability of
systems is dependent on their sensory receptors (Observability capacity).
De Florio (2014) reviewed two milestone works on systems behaviour by
Rosenblueth, Wiener & Bigelow (1943), and Kenneth Boulding (1956) on
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Systems in a social setting. De Florio identified five classes Random, Purposeful,
Reactive and Social Behaviour.
Castelle, Baugh & Bradley (2015) posit that system improvement could be
achieved by studying the goals, goal-oriented behaviour functions and purpose of
systems.

Therefore, studying the goal oriented behaviour and purpose of different
subsystem-ships will support an analysis of safety because behaviour is
determined by systems structures and components as well as being goal-directed
by its finality/teleology11.

2.3 Safety Regulatory Approach
Historically, maritime safety regulations were adopted after devastating accidents
(Juda, 1977; Psaraftis, 2002; Schröder-Hinrichs, Hollnagel, & Baldauf, Hofmann
& Kataria, 2013; Karahalios, 2017). Pomeroy, & Earthy (2017), state that though
these regulations have improved the safety of ships, ship accident records have
not improved recently. Others such as Bhattacharya (2009) opine that safety
regulations have yet to achieve their full potential. Notwithstanding, there is the
need to further improve their effectiveness. The Goal-Based Approach (Proactive
Approach) is a laudable safety and risk approach (Ministral Rosa, 2018).
Similarly, thorough safety investigation as mandated by the Casualty Investigation
Code (2010), Regulation XI-1/6 of SOLAS, is one crucial way of improving the
effectiveness of regulations (IMO, 2010). Additionally, it is useful to learn from
other industries, but this approach is often dismissed because the maritime sector
has unique conditions (Pomeroy, & Earthy, 2017). The concept of resilience 12 in
safety as proposed by scholars (Manuel, 2011; Praetorius and Lundh, 2013;

11

According to De Florio (2014), purposeful behaviour is considered as finality while predictive
behaviour is considered teleology. However, as this work relates to purposeful behaviour including
predictive and reactive, finality and teleology will be used synonymously.
12
See Glossary for definition of resilience.
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Praetorius and Hollnagel, 2014; Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2015; Jain, Reese,
Chaudhari, Mentzer & Mannan, 2017) could improve safety of shipping.

However, a practical case of shipping with very high safety standards would be a
crucial model for improving safety. This review identified Pacific Nuclear
Transport Limited (PNTL) ships to have a very high safety record (PNTL, 2019)
and worthy of in-depth study.

2.4 Summary
Contemporary safety issues are viewed in a systemic approach. This study fills
the knowledge gap by applying systems thinking to an analysis of warship, CG
and commercial ship safety. Safety in systems is better understood through
analysis of behaviour and finality. Counterfinality may be the reason why high
safety is elusive in ship operations. Ship operations may exhibit purposeful
feedback-driven or reactive behaviour. They may also be predictive or proactive
in behaviour. Ships as socio-technical entities may exhibit social behaviour
through their hierarchy, communication links and organisation. Safety regulation
has evolved from reactive to proactive (GBS) in approach. Higher safety standards
may be attained from studying a shipping system operating with risk level at as
low as reasonably possible and zero-accident record.

31

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Research Methodology
Research could adopt various strategies or methods (Verschuren & Doorewaard,
2010). The choice of a suitable method depends on the ability of the method to
achieve the research aim and objectives (Gray, 2013). Qualitative methods were
selected due to the quest of this research to investigate safety in shipping.
Qualitative methods have desirable attributes in the ability to fit a context and
reveal insights on a topic. They are easily applicable in a real world context and
have the ability to address complex issues. Though qualitative research
investigates a small number of cases, it examines those few cases in great detail
and draws deep meanings (Mahoney & Goerts, 2006; Creswell 2014; Lune &
Berg, 2017).

Specifically, phenomenology approach was used in the research. Phenomenology
enables the exploration of experiences of individuals to reveal the true form of
phenomenon or attributes such as safety (Kafle, 2011). This enhances
understanding and the possibility of developing credible solutions. However, there
may be a gap between solutions from the research and what can actually work in
real life. Manuel (2011) suggested that the insulated settings of theoretical
research requires solutions or recommendations to be adjusted to fit the
practicality of the real life shipping industry. The shipping industry is a sociotechnical system that requires practical measures to resolve its complicated
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challenges. Solutions to such challenges should be descriptive and practicable.
Qualitative approach, which enable in-depth study to give insights into novel
topics or unexplored phenomena, is therefore used in this work (Panke, 2018).
The most widely applied data collection methods of interviews and focus groups
(Gill &Baillie, 2018) were used to gather sufficient perspectives on warship, CG
and commercial ship safety.

3.1 Focus Group
A focus group is a well-planned series of discussions structured to gain
perceptions on a particular subject of interest in a permissive, nonthreatening
environment (Morgan, 2018; Young, 2019). Krueger & Casey (2015) assert that
focus groups are successful because they produce useful results at a reasonable
cost. A total of 6 focus group sessions were conducted in this study. Three sessions
served as preliminary sessions and another three as main research sessions. The
three preliminary sessions served as a "climate survey" and aided in planning and
selecting the research theme and questions.

The main research sessions formed the core of the work. Krueger & Casey (2015)
opine that the purpose of focus groups should be clear and encourage discussions
on ideas. They should also clarify opinions, and make recommendations on a
course of action. The main research sessions had a clear purpose of collecting data
to answer the research question. Discussions clarified biased opinions and ended
with suggestions on ways to improve safety in systems.

The sessions were founded on a three-stage strategy aimed at identifying trends
and perceptions for effective comparison and contrast of data. The first focus
group of the main research session provided an understanding of the topic; the
second served as a pilot test and the third focus group (purpose-made) enabled
evaluation of data as shown in Figure 6. Therefore, the findings in this research
are from the three focus groups of the main session only.
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Figure 6: Three-stage strategy for research focus groups (Kruegar & Casey,
2015).

3.2 Interview
In such an exploratory study, the need for a benchmark for discussions was
essential. PNTL, a member of the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI), has
incredible safety standards with a zero record of accidents (Chaplin, 2019),
making it an excellent benchmark of “Safety First” for the whole maritime
industry. This model of “Safety First” was developed from a one-on-one interview
with a seasoned Master Mariner, with 26 years sailing experience (6 years as
Master) on PNTL ships. To build a watertight model, the primary data gathered
from the interview (primary source) were supplemented by data from internet
sources (secondary source).

This study followed a semi-structured interview approach using open-ended
questions. This approach allowed the interviewee to respond without providing
clues or setting boundaries on anticipated answers (Krueger & Casey, 2015). The
non-directive approach enabled the development of a rich model. Deductively,
practices, standards and measures which make PNTL ships operate at high safety
standards could also make warships, CG and commercial ships safer.
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On completion of the interview, extensive time was dedicated to manual
transcription. Auto-transcription was not used since there are higher chances of
error necessitating a re-transcription and equating the work effort to a manual
transcription. Submitting the whole raw data from an interview to an online
transcription service may not be ethical. Regardless, manual transcription
provides the opportunity to review answers and glean subtle meanings, which may
not be possible with auto-transcription. Additionally, manual transcription enables
re-organization and effective structuring of answers to enhance meaning. Lecture
notes from a series of four lectures presented on PNTL to the Maritime Safety and
Environmental Administration 2019 class in World Maritime University were
used to supplement the interview.

3.3 Participants
Focus group participants were selected based on professional experience, unique
qualities and the ability to contribute rich information to the research purpose
(Etikan, Musa & Alkassim, 2016). All participants in this research had maritime
or maritime affiliated backgrounds.

Moreover, the setting of all focus groups made participants feel comfortable;
respected, willing and free to give opinions without judgement. There was
spontaneous self-disclosure among participants, revealing what they really
thought and felt. This was due to participants sharing similar backgrounds.
Therefore, many opinions were offered towards the achievement of the research
aim.

Participants were introduced to the research topic and the respective methods
(focus group and interview). Forms explaining research ethical and confidentiality
standards were administered. Participants signed the forms, giving full
participatory consent.
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3.4 Data Collection
During focus groups, data was collected on whiteboards and organised in tables.
Data collected was compared and contrasted without necessarily coming to a
decision or consensus. All focus groups were supplemented with audio recordings
and photographs. Photographs have a history of being effective tools in research;
particularly in anthropology and ethnography (Flick 2006; Gray, 2009).
Photographs capture details and are quicker than the human eye in recording facts.

Data was collected with open-ended questions during both focus group and
interview. The questions were sequenced from general to specific.
Audio recordings, supplemented by notes, were the main tool for collecting data
during the interview. Questions were carefully selected, sequenced and organised
in the following thematic areas:


The owners of ships and maritime operations systems.



The main mission of each maritime operation system.



The critical safety design factors of the various ships.



The recruiting, organization and training of crew as individuals and a
whole.



Certain critical operations conducted at sea.



The management of fatigue.



Factors considered in promotion of crew.



Sea time and its effect on crew fatigue and capability.

3.5 Theoretical Orientation
The theoretical orientation of the research is based on application of the
highlighted concepts of systems theory in Chapters 1 and 2. As earlier stated,
finality is derived from behaviour and not rhetoric or stated goals. Finality and
behaviour are the main theoretical themes in this research. Equifinality, counter
finality and purposeful behaviour are important facets of the two main themes
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which guided this work. Additionally, allocated finality13 or “espoused theory”
may differ from achieved (real-life) finality14 (Argyris & Schon 1996; McLaren
2015). Therefore “safety first” can be the allocated finality of a ship, but not its
achieved finality.

3.6 Reliability, Credibility and Transferability
Reliability and validity of such a research relies on its conformity with ethics,
framing of data collection, analysis and the way findings are presented (Meriam
& Tsidell, 2016). The researcher used thorough approaches in collecting data and
applied systems thinking tools and matrices to analyse data and present findings
in a sequential manner.

To ensure credibility, participants were given transcribed copies of focus group
sessions and interview to peruse for accuracy and correct if necessary.
Transferability is proving that research findings could apply to different context,
times and populations (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Statistics Solutions, 2019).
Generalizability and transferability is deemed to be low in phenomenological
studies (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 1997). The researcher enhanced
transferability by giving “thick description”15 (Ponterotto, 2006) of the research
settings and data collection methods.

3.7 Research Ethics
This research complied with WMU’s Research and Ethics Committee and
generally accepted research ethics standards. Consent of participants was obtained
and documented on a form prior to interview and focus group sessions. A sample
of this form is in Appendix 5. To ensure transparency and gain confidence of the

13

See Glossary for definition of allocated finality.
See Glossary for definition of achieved finality.
15
See Glossary for explanation of thick description.
14
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interviewee, the purpose, essence, sequence, and future use of interview and focus
group answers were explained.

All research participants completed the consent forms after agreeing, without
reservation, to partake in the discussions. Interestingly, participants were eager to
offer answers and even provided unsolicited answers which enriched the research.
Both the interview and focus groups exceeded their allocated time period and had
to be stopped by the researcher.

3.8 Limitations of the Study
It would be shallow and hypocritical not to indicate that a novel study as this
would be without limitations. The limitations influenced the definition of the
research topic, data assessment, test for reliability and validity of data and choice
of research methods. The researchers’ rationality of limitations was bounded and
became relatively comprehensive upon completion of the study.

3.8.1 Limitations of Qualitative Study
Qualitative research is known to be limited by biases and subjectivity in opinions
of respondents. Largely, perceptions may not be true and this is a limitation in
obtaining objective results and fair analysis. Additionally, the results of a
qualitative study may be limited to the context of the study and may not be
applicable in other contexts which may even have similar characteristics.
However, to gain insight into subjects it may be necessary to sacrifice
generalization for precise investigation.

3.8.2 Participant Perception and Rhetoric
Perceptions of safety practices and standards in their system of operation may be
higher than what really pertains. This may be due to the need to create a good
perception or perpetuate rhetoric. These differences between reality and
perception could have affected the study and were addressed by cross-examining
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responses. Similarly, some participants intellectualized answers to make them
seem thoughtful and reflective. However, real-life decision making is unconscious
(Zaltman, 2003) and different from focus group answers.

3.8.3 Experience of the Researcher
The researcher, as a serving naval officer with some training in commercial
shipping operations, tends to view answers with a bias based on experience. The
particular tendency for the researcher to be prejudiced in assessing the safety
standards of warships is high. Flick (2006), asserts that qualitative research data
could be misinterpreted due to the influence of the researcher´s own opinion.
However, this was addressed by having a moderator (supervisor) for the focus
group who was a commercial ship Master with some naval experience and by
reducing the researcher´s interview both in the focus group and interviews.

3.8.4 Data limitations
Though the researcher cited many cases of recent warship accidents, data from
investigative reports was limited. Except for the US and Norway Navies, which
show transparency, most navies have no open publications of accident reports or
even official publication of accidents. More often, the work cites US and
Norwegian accident cases because of the availability of information.
3.8.5 Time Limitation of a Master’s Programme
Data collection through interviews and detailed engagement with navy, CG and
commercial shipping companies was limited by time since the research had to
completed within the spate of 14-months for an MSC in WMU.

3.9 Summary of Chapter
The research used qualitative methods of focus groups and interviews to
effectively investigate and collect data on the dynamics of safety on ships. These
produced findings that fit the socio-technical industry of maritime operations. Six
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focus groups, divided into two parts of three, were held. The first three set the tone
for the research and the second three gathered data to answer the research
question. An interview to build a model of “Safety First” on PNTL ships was
conducted to serve as benchmark for analysis.

All participants in the research had maritime or affiliated backgrounds. Data was
collected using semi-structured questions in order to allow emergent opinions.
Notably, allocated finality may not be achieved. Limitations were considered
through all stages of the research and measures were taken to mitigate their effects
on outcomes.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS
4.0 Introduction
This chapter presents and discusses the data, demographics of participants and
data coding. The chapter focuses on data analysis and concludes with a summary
of the analysis.

4.1 Data Presentation and Participant Demographics
To enhance clarity of presentation, data from the focus groups and interview are
presented in tables as shown in appendices 2 and 4, respectively. Data are grouped
under similar headings to enable easy correlation and analysis.

4.1.1 Interview (PNTL Model)
Data from the interview were sectioned into 5 themes: owners, mission, design of
ship, crew, operations of ship at sea as well as emergent discussions. Emergent
discussions centred on involvement of management and role of regulators in ship
safety. The PNTL Model served as a benchmark of an organisation with safety as
achieved finality. The organisation and operations of PNTL ships were used in the
analysis.

4.1.2 Main Focus Groups
Tables in Appendix 4 are organised into 5 thematic parts: ownership and mission,
crew, design of ship, operations at sea and emergent discussions. Each part
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contains consolidated data from the focus groups (main research session).
Participants of the focus groups had relevant seafaring expertise and experience
in warship, CG and commercial ship operations. However, in some working
groups, persons without seafaring experience also participated in discussions.
Discussions were conducted on the following dates with persons grouped as
indicated subsequently:


Focus Group 1 was held on 16 January 2019 with 8 students of Maritime
Energy Management Class. Professionally, the 8 students represented a
Captain of an oil rig, Chief Engineer, warship Captain, Second Engineer,
Economist, Computer Engineer and two classification society Surveyors.
These participants were from 8 different countries in Africa, Europe and
Asia.



Focus Group 2 was held on 22 January 2019 with 22 students of Maritime
Safety and Environmental Administration Class. The 22 students
comprised 8 Maritime administrators, 7 Merchant mariners, 5 CG officers,
2 Naval officers and 2 classification society Surveyors. Participants were
from 20 countries in Asia, Africa, Middle East, the Caribbean, Pacific
Islands and South America.



Focus Group 3 (Purpose-made focus group) was held on 4 June 2019 with
9 persons selected based on their unique experience in warship, CG and
commercial ship operation. The 9 persons included 3 persons each with
experience in Navy, CG and Commercial ship operations. The group
comprised a balanced spread of participants from 9 different countries
across Middle East, Africa, Asia and South America.

Participants from each category of maritime operations were interested in
highlighting the negatives of the other categories while defending and boosting
the positives of theirs. This shows the inertia of systems to learn from others.
Therefore, participants had poor perspective of other modes of maritime
operations. The moderator (research supervisor) and assistant moderator
(researcher) had cross knowledge in the various areas discussed having undergone
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training and served time on ships of different systems. This served to correct these
misconceptions, which could have negatively impacted the research. The
participants were actively encouraged to contribute opinions during the discussion
and measures were taken to prevent the dominance of few individuals. Again, the
discussions confirmed the theoretical background of the research given in the
earlier three chapters indicating that behaviour is an indication of purpose and not
rhetoric.

4.2 Data Coding
To enable clarity, colour codes were used to represent data found in multiple and
individual focus groups. Green for multiple (2 or 3) focus groups, blue for focus
group 1, red for focus group 2 and purple for focus group 3, in that order. The
colour coding used in this research is based on Grounded theory (Burnard, Gill,
Stewart, Treasure & Chadwick, 2008; Skjott Linneberg & Korsgaard 2019).
Coding was used for focus group data only.

4.3 Data Analysis
The research used qualitative content analysis in studying data from documents,
audio, video, and photographs (Hseih & Shannon, 2005; Verschuren &
Doorewaard, 2010; Boréus & Bergström, 2017; Lune & Berg, 2017). Prior to the
commencement of the purpose-made focus group, participants were required to
indicate which category of ship was the safest. Most respondents indicated that
they considered the ship environment or category they work in as safest, which
shows that subjectivity influenced perception of safety. Additionally, individuals
judged safety with a parochial view of their institution, without the ability to
compare and project themselves in other sectors with different safety practices and
constraints.
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4.3.1 Analysis of Ownership and Mission as High Level Control and Finality
Subsystem-Ships form important parts of maritime systems. Each system works
to achieve finality and each subsystem participates in achieving the overarching
finality.

The owner can be assimilated as the control element because they have the
ultimate power. They impose constraints in order to drive behaviour of ships
towards achievement of the overarching company/organisational finality. Social
systems such as private or public companies have mechanisms of control. Owners
in social systems use various control mechanisms which could be formal (specific
laws and processes) or informal (culture and traditions). Communication or flows
(physical, monetary, etc.) are necessary to bind systems together and to ensure the
effectiveness of the control. In our studied systems, control relies heavily on
information distribution, written documents, verbal orders, resource allocation
and supply systems.

Notably, ownership of a system gives the legitimate power to determine the type of
control mechanism to influence behaviour and to achieve allocated finality (Leveson,
2011). Effective control ensures coherence and stability (through resilience) of the
system. Control mechanisms in the Navy and CG are typically constructed as vertical
hierarchies of command. In shipping companies, the top management, appointed by
owners or shareholders, exercises control over the system and its subsystems.

In order to assess the overall performance of a system (including its safety
aspects), Leveson (2011) proposes a matrix of analysis highlighting the
importance of feedback loops and controls. Therefore, the researcher considers
that efficient control processes have to fulfil these four conditions:


Goal Condition. The controller must have a goal or goals. FINALITY
could be actually achieved or just rhetoric. Finality is the final state of the

44

goal. It is synonymous with Aristotle’s idea of “Final Cause” as stated in
Pérez-Álvarez (2017). Though a specific finality could be stated (rhetoric),
behaviour could lead to a different achieved finality. The achieved finality
could counter the allocated finality.


Action Condition. The controller must be able to affect the state of the
system, and have POWER over the system and its parts (Leveson, 2011).
It is the ability to affect or influence the functioning of the system.



Model Condition. The controller must be (or contain) a model of the
system (Leveson, 2011). It is ability to UNDERSTAND the system itself,
its part and its functioning. Since this work is viewed in an open socialtechnical system there is the need for participants (people) in the systems
to contribute to the modeling of the system. The model so obtained would
be a best-fit for the specific environment and not just a best model.



Observability Condition. The controller must be able to ascertain the
state of the system (Leveson, 2011). This entails the ability to COLLECT
DATA and INFORMATION from parts of the system and subsystems. It
shows the importance of feedback loops in systems.

Additionally, effective systems control requires effective communication flows.
Moreover, communication in the system does not only enable transmission of
information but also binds the systems as a coherent unit. This binding ensures
interaction between parts in order to form a complete whole having emergent
properties. As per Leveson (2011), safety is an “emergent property of systems”.
In this work, the ship being a subsystem, we can deduce that the safety of the
overall system depends on the safety of each subsystem. The accidents involving
KNM Helge Ingstad, USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald affected the overall Navy
system (US Navy, 2017a; AIBN, 2018). This is identical in the context of shipping
where a single casualty can damage the entire system. In the case of Herald of
Free Enterprise or Exxon Valdez accidents, the entire network of related shipping
companies (system) folded or changed ownership (MSA1894, 1987; NOAA,
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2014). Safety is, therefore, important for survival of shipping institutions and
navies.

In open systems such as Navy, environmental factors need to be considered. A
system environment is the immediate surroundings that interact with the system
and can influence the functioning of the system. In this respect, the economic crisis
in Argentina affected the allocation of resources to the Navy which ultimately
impacted its vessels leading to a major disaster for a submarine (Woody, 2017;
Archus, 2019). Indeed, a system component (e.g. a ship- subsystem) may function
safely in an environment but could malfunction and cause accidents in another
environment (natural, social, economic, political, and cultural).
4.3.1.1 Warships in Navy-system
Warships, as subsystems, have individual finality which forms part of the overall
finality of the System-Navy. The Navy has other subsystems and components like
network of buildings and people constituting administration, logistic support,
medical care, repair yards, personnel accommodation, financial and training
institution. Each subsystem has its own finality, which leads to the achievement
of the overall finality of the System-Navy. At the centre of these subsystems is the
control element (ownership) which is the Government or Ministry of Defence
(MoD). MoD decides and exercises its control via strict hierarchy of command,
which circulates information flows between all parts of the system in order to
guide each part’s behaviour.
Hierarchical mechanisms imply that there are at least two levels in the system.
Navy systems and even subsystems have several levels of command, structured to
facilitate task execution and relay of orders. A typical warship-subsystem
hierarchy is shown in Figure 7, with highest authority being the Flag Officer Fleet
(FOF).
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Figure 7: Typical subsystem-warship Hierarchy or Command Structure. Based
on British Navy and Commonwealth Navy structure. Source: Researcher
Communication of policies, instructions, feedback and resources is attained
through hierarchical structure. It is a two-way communication mechanism from
higher command to lowest rank individuals and vice versa.
Under government control, MoD acquires legitimate power over the System-Navy
and set the necessary constraints to guide behaviour as determined or allocated. In
rare cases, accidents occur which are largely out of the control of MoD or even
warships. The earlier stated case of MT Sama running into a Taiwanese Frigate
Ning Yang berthed in harbour shows an accident that MoD or the frigate could
have done little to prevent (Strong, 2019). The four conditions in the warship
context are as follows:


Goal Condition. The goal of the System-Navy is to protect State interests
using the maritime domain (e.g. defence of national territory and the
projection of national power abroad). This requires subsystem-warships to
conduct combat operations against external aggression or other military
(or non-military) vessels. Safety is not an allocated finality of subsystemwarship but an essential condition for success in military operations. For
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example, the US Navy in the Pacific maintains a combat force ready to be
deployed for protection of US interests (Sputnik, 2015; US Pacific Fleet,
2016). Therefore, it may be “mission first” in navies. However, such
overseas deployment has cost implications and can lead to a drain on
resources. The result would be a decision to make cutbacks which have
possible negative effects on safety.


Action Condition. Action condition entails MoD’s ability to command
and direct operations, administer personnel, manage and allocate
resources, and promote, reward and punish undesirable acts. Generally,
action condition is having power over the system to attain allocated goals.
For example; the decision by the US Navy to train sailors according to
standards in STCW could greatly improve training and performance of
sailors (US Navy, 2017a). However, re-occurring accidents may be
evidence of an insufficient action condition. On 22 April 2017, a fire
incident occurred on Chilean warship Sargento Aldea during maintenance
works on oxygen bottles for the ship’s infirmary. A similar explosion and
fire incident re-occurred on 29 August 2019 on the same ship during
similar maintenance but this time led to crew injuries (Sabado, 2017;
Voytenko, 2019b). Some actions or influences may also lead to negative
unintended effects.



Model Condition. A good model condition is the capacity of MoD or
Navy Headquarters (NHQ) to understand the subtleties of subsystem-ship
functioning. In socio-technical systems, model condition should be fitted
to the environment or paradigm in order to be effective. Wrong
understanding/construction of the model, the environment or the paradigm
of operation may challenge the subsystem efficiency, performance or
safety. To ensure models are as accurate as possible, participants in the
operations of the model (Captain, watchkeepers and sailors) must partake
in the refinement of the modeling.
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A good warship Model condition can be achieved through enhanced
communication flows between MoD or NHQ decision-makers and
operators through trust and established feedback loops. For example, the
decision of the Argentinian Navy to cut budgetary allocations to ships
should have considered the specificities of submarines. Submarines have
special propulsion systems and operate in an enclosed environment
without escape. The investigation suggested that budgetary cutbacks and
insufficient maintenance resulted in deterioration in the operational status
of the submarine. The sinking of San Juan (S-42) has been attributed
directly to a fire in batteries though budgetary cuts and wider
organizational failure seems to be the main causes (Cropsey, 2017;
Archus, 2019). Indubitably, Navy authorities knew the specificities of
submarines but seemed unable to model the impacts of cutbacks on
maintenance of such vessels.
However, the Russian Navy changed its approach to integrate
environmental changes. Contrary to the US Navy, the Russian Navy is not
pursuing an interventionist strategy but rather intends to maintain a
regional presence of small ships (Axe, 2019). Consequently, the Russian
Navy has adapted its subsystems-warships accordingly. It is building
smaller ships with a full load of armaments instead of large ships (Axe,
2019). Following the sinking of the PD-50, a floating drydock which was
used to maintain the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, Russian Navy HQ
has planned to decommission the aircraft carrier (Kut, 2018). This shows
flexibility in modelling warship operations but its impact on safety is yet
to be observed.


Observability Condition. Observability in the Navy system is the ability
of MoD or NHQ to accurately assess the status and confirm the proper
functioning of any part of the system at any period. The formal feedback
mechanism in Navies follows hierarchical communication and its multiple
levels. This feedback structure could lead to distortion/disruption of
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information, particularly in can-do cultures such as the US Navy (US
Navy, 2017a). Can-do culture leads ship Commanding Officers (COs) to
attempt challenging tasks with continually decreasing resources without
questioning or complaining about related-risks. COs with Can-do culture
are usually glorified as resourceful. This could gradually degrade the
safety standards across the fleet, leading to series of accidents (possibly
the case in the US Navy). US Navy High Command seemed not to properly
understand the operational condition of ships deployed in the Pacific fleet
as demonstrated by the casualty investigation concerning USS McCain
and USS Fitzgerald (US Navy, 2017b). It shows a limited observability
condition, missing feedback to top management on the true state of ships
(US Navy, 2017a). Poor observability condition has been highlighted by
an investigative report to the Argentine parliament as the cause of the loss
of San Juan (Rey, 2019). Navies should consider multiple ways of
gathering accurate feedback in order to ensure an appropriate level of
operational demand on each part (subsystem) of the entire system.
4.3.1.2 Coast Guard Ships in Coast Guard Institution-System
Control in CG is often similar to that in Navy because some CG institutions are
structured as military organizations under the MoD. The four control conditions
analysed in the CG system are as follows:


Goal Condition. This condition involves policing and emergency
response. These goals require specialized training, relevant equipment and
sufficient resources. Notably, CGs goals are easily observable when
achieved. CG and Naval goals could conflict, particularly in coastal
maritime security (Bansal, 2008; Blickstein, Conley, Tannehill, Schendt
& Etchegaray 2018). However, they share the same overall objective
which is to protect State interests.



Action Condition. Similar to Navy, the controller of the system is CG
Headquarters (CGHQ) which depends on government/Ministry (Defence
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or Interior) decisions. The strict military hierarchy makes the control
system mechanical, i.e., top-down and authoritative structure. During the
2019 US federal breakdown, the USCG was affected by the lack of
budgetary in-flows (Woody, 2019). This lack could have affected missions
and general order in the organisation since salaries were also affected. In
this respect, the Commandant of the USCG Admiral Schultz declared the
commitment of USCG to fulfil its missions (relying on budgetary stock)
while awaiting budgetary inflows (Woody, 2019). This example shows
that the control structure of any system is heavily dependent on in-flows
and stocks. A prolonged disruption of in-flow and empty stock would
affect the overall command structure and the survival of the system. The
decision to initiate actions also depends on in-flows of information as
shown by the following example. The recent encounters and collisions
between Chinese and Taiwanese ships have caused the Taiwanese CGHQ
to decide to install anti-collision systems on 17 of its new ships (Martina,
2019). This shows a good action condition which could improve safety of
ships and crew as well as ensure effective patrols.


Model Condition. Model condition depends on the ability of CGHQ to
model subsystem-ship function of saving lives, protecting the environment
or enforcing regulations. Following the 2016 USCGC Thetis versus
towing vessel Matachin accidents in Panama the model of operation of
USCGC in the complex environment of the canal may not have been
appropriate. The 2017 collision between USCGC Tampa versus tug boat
Cerro Santiago (NTSB/MAB-17/22, 2016; NTSB/MAB-17/37, 2017) in
similar conditions at night supports this position.



Observability Condition. Observability is also influenced by a vertical
hierarchical structure. This may cause authority gradient which cripples
the ability to gather accurate feedback. The collision between USCGC
Cuyahoga and MV Santa Cruz II is a classic case of authority gradient
where the Commanding Officer (CO) of the ship made an incorrect
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assessment of the navigational situation (USCG, 1979). Due to the strict
command structure on the ship, no crew member could give the CO
feedback on the looming danger.

4.3.1.3 Commercial Ships in Shipping-System
Ship-owners or company16 are defined in international regulations as the control
system of ships because they assume the “responsibility for the operation of the
ship” either directly as owners or through subcontractors (reference to MLC, 2006
and ISM Code). Here-after, shipowner/company represents all forms of private
control over commercial ships. In this context, ships are subordinate to the power
of company management.


Goal Condition. The specific goal of ships (subsystem) is to carry-out
maritime activities in order to generate profits for shareholders.
Shareholders have legitimate power and define management structures to
remotely control and command ship operations. Shipping companies claim
“Safety First” because it is a mandatory requirement allocated under the
ISM Code (IMO, 2000). Despite the “Safety First” rhetoric, the behaviour
of some ships may be in contradiction. It indicates that “Profit First” may
be the real goal to attain. For example, Exxon shipping had “Safety First”
as an allocated finality. However, the reduced manning levels and
increased work load on crew generated the condition of unsafe practices
(counterfinality) leading to the Exxon Valdez disaster (NTSB/MAR-

16

As The ISM Code (#1.1.2) defines company as: the owner of the ship or any other organization or
person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation
of the ship from the ship-owner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all
duties and responsibility imposed by the Code."
The MLC 2006 defines shipowner as: the owner of the ship or another organisation or person, such as
the manager, agent or bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for the operation of the
ship from the owner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over the duties and
responsibilities imposed on shipowners in accordance with this Convention, regardless of whether any
other organization or persons fulfil certain of the duties or responsibilities on behalf of the shipowner.
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90/04, 1990). Therefore, the goal of “Safety First” should be deduced from
behaviour (conduct of the ship in ship operations) but not rhetoric.


Action Condition. This condition infers the ability of shipowners to
influence the activities in the system. In commercial shipping, the capacity
to influence is derived from owners’ rights. A shipowner decides on ship
design and construction, type and areas of ship operation and activities.
Shipowners also utilize hierarchical mechanisms. Though this hierarchy is
usually bureaucratic and has limited number of layers, it does not often
affect organisational effectiveness. In 1988, the Scandinavian Star under
its owners had a fire incident resulting in chaotic firefighting due to
inability of crew to communicate among themselves (Ulfsson, 2018). The
ship was transferred to a new owner in 1990. The new shipowner decided
to operate the ship on a new route, soon after acquiring it, without properly
training its multi-national crew (Norwegian Official Report 1E, 1991). A
fire incident on the ship’s first day of operation resulted in a similar chaotic
situation due to the inability of crew to communicate amongst themselves
and passengers, leading to the loss of 159 lives (Palmberg & Georgsson,
2009; Ulfsson, 2018). This shows an inability of the shipowner to take
necessary action to positively influence the safety of the ship. Furthermore,
the trend of fire on Ro-ro passenger/ passenger/cruise ships (Norman
Atlantic, Carnival Triumph, Cruise Ship Caribbean Fantasy, Grande
America, Viking Sky and Santika Nusantara fire) has continued over the
years (Mileski, Wang and Beacham 2014; Shipdetective.com, 2019;
Voytenko, 2019c; SFGATE, 2019; Savvides, 2019). There seems to be a
lack of ability of shipowners to take necessary action to stop these fire
incidents. The inability of action may be due to lack of commitment to
safety.



Model Condition. This is the capacity to understand the system
functioning in its particular environment. Basically the design and
construction of the subsystem-commercial ship is based on the
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understanding of shipowners. Since models are simplifications of the real
world they are wrong (or have limited validity). Models of dynamics in
systems explore what would happen if certain driving factors changed in
certain ways. Such models ask “what if?” (Meadows, 2008). There was an
ineffective model condition during the Torrey Canyon disaster. As the
“what if?” of a passage through a short cut would have revealed the high
possibility of the ship hitting an underwater rock. Conversely, PNTL ships
have been optimally modelled to ensure “Safety first”. The “What if?” of
an accident is reputation damage to the whole Nuclear industry. As such,
safety is considered more important than the mission (transport of cargo).
Additionally, former ship Masters are appointed into top management
positions and have a major role in the safety management of ships. In a
case where the security of the cargo is threatened, two ships sail in tandem
to serve as distractions to would-be attackers.


Observability Condition in commercial shipping is necessary to allow
shipowners to know exactly the state of the system at all times. This
informs decisions on actions and redefinition of the model of operation. A
classic case of observability in commercial shipping is the reporting of
accident near misses. It is widely known that there is underreporting of
near misses in shipping (Bhattacharya, 2011; Lappalainen, Kuronen &
Tapaninen, 2012; VanderHoon & Knapp, 2015; Xue, Tang & Walters,
2019). Near misses could inform taking of adequate corrective measures
to prevent accidents. Additionally, feedback on safety hazards is limited
by authority gradient leading to accidents as in the case of Bow Mariner
(Bureau Enquetes –Accident/Mer [BEAmer], 2003). PNTL ships have an
effective safety culture where the Master and crew are not blamed for near
misses but rather given sufficient resources to correct those potential
accident conditions. A good safety culture which encourages crew
members to report possible safety hazards creates good observability
condition.
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4.3.1.4 Common trends in control mechanism


The Goal of warship, CG ship and commercial is “Mission first” and not
“Safety First” as claimed or allocated. The design, crewing and operations
of ships are highly dependent on owners who decide based on the purpose
of the ship.



The action of owners to manage fatigue on ships is ineffective since it is
still prevalent. Fatigue is a common cause of accidents.



Safety of ships is determined by the amount of resources committed by the
owners. Reducing resource in-flow (ie, cutting budget, smaller crew, less
time at sea) reduces safety level of ships. To maintain high safety levels
ship operations, need to be re-modeled to suit their context. Participation
of crew in modeling ship operations makes it more accurate which
enhances safety. Ship operation should be modeled to fit the environment.



Institutional cultures such as authority gradient and strict hierarchies, as in
Helge Ingstad, Cuyagoha and Bow Mariner, contribute to accident. Good
observability conditions could be enhanced through crew feedback,
encouraging crew to speak up when safety hazards are noticed.

4.3.2 Analysis of Crewing of Ships
The discussions in this session apply to warships, CG ship and commercial ships.


Group Think. Some scholars opine that Group think17 contributed to the
events that unfolded in the Titanic disaster (Bureau EnquêtesAccidents/Mer 2003; Manuel, 2011; Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012).
Similarly, the collision of Helge Ingstad could have been averted if any
watchkeeper had reassessed the situation. That will enable taking action to
avoid collision instead of assuming the ship was passing a stationary
floating object to starboard.

17

See Glossary for definition of Group think.
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Magnitude of Recent Warship Accidents. Recent warship accidents
were devastating. In the Helge Ingstad collision, Norway with 5 state-ofthe-art Frigates lost 20% of its naval combat capability (Larter & Sprenger,
2018). The Argentine Navy with 3 submarine (Saunders, 2016), lost 30%
of its fleet with the sinking of San Juan. Similarly the US Navy
strategically maintains an average of 5218 operational ships and suffered
loss/damage to 4 ships in 2017-2018 representing nearly 8% of its active
fleet through accidents. A commercial shipping company with such losses
or casualty could lose its competitive edge or even collapse. The high
profile Navy accidents and investigation reports has raised concerns about
training and experience, bridge operation, ship construction standards,
maintenance, effects of budget adjustments, hierarchical structure and top
level management, etc.



Human Element. It is claimed that between 70% - 90% of accidents are
caused by human elements (i.e. operators) (Osés & Ventikos, n.d.;
Mundin, 2015; Barnett & Pekcan, 2017). A critical examination of this
statement may lead to certain fundamental questions (Soares & Teixeira,
2001; Haraati-Mokhtari, 2007; Graziano, Teixeira & Soares, 2016).
Indeed, every aspect of the shipping industry is constructed by humans,
meaning all causes of accidents are due to the human element (IMO, 2003;
Barnett & Pekcan, 2017). The ramming of a jetty by USCGC Cypress
following a propulsion control computer failure could also be attributed to
the human element (NTSB, 2017; Safety at Sea, 2019) – software
designers. The implication of the human element (from operators to
designers and decision-makers) in accident requires a holistic approach
which could be facilitated by system thinking.



Systems Approach. System approach offers an effective way of viewing
safety as an emergent property of systems. Recent accidents involving

18

https://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146
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Argentinean, Norwegian and US warships reveal systemic problems such
as cutbacks on maintenance resources, poor leadership and safety culture
caused by unsafe practices and insufficient training and experience. The
development of Safety II culture (Hollnagel et al., 1999, 2015) requires
top management, leadership and the active participation of all crew
members. Safety II19 focuses on successful or good safety practices and
seeks to enhance those desirable practices. The application of Safety II
concepts to warships, CG and commercial ships reveals organisational
(systemic) influences on safety culture on ships (subsystems). Therefore,
Safety II is a useful concept in system thinking.


Liability. The practice of apportioning full blame to individual crew
members may lead to counter-finality because it cuts the link between the
individual and the system inside which his/her actions were predetermined. Therefore, no systemic investigation is conducted.

4.3.3 Analysis of Ship Design and Construction (Trade-offs)
Generally, ship design and construction are determined by the intended purpose
of the ship. The design and construction of warships, CG and commercial ships
may, therefore, be similar or significantly different. Below are presented some key
characteristics discussed by the participants of the focus groups.

4.3.3.1 Warships


Subdivision and Aesthetic. Warships are designed with high subdivisions
to enable isolation of compartments to withstand combat damage. It causes
a reduction in aesthetic appeal of these compartments. Therefore, sailors
on such warships have to squeeze through tight spaces and move through
several compartments, possibly increasing crew fatigue. Better fatigue
management would be facilitated with an optimal balance between decent

19

See Glossary definition of Safety I and Safety II.
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accommodation and adequate compartmentalization. Further, better crew
rotation could limit fatigue.


Structural Strength and Hydrodynamic hull. Warships are built to be
slender with a relatively smaller width to enhance maneouvrability and
hydrodynamic capabilities. In such design trade-offs, structural strength
and damage survivability may be affected. The sinking of Helge Ingstad
raised concerns (Larter & Pine, 2018) because it was expected that a
warship should have sufficient damage stability.

4.3.3.2 Coast Guard Ships


Specialised and Multi-purpose. CG ships are usually small or medium
size vessels but fully equipped with the tools and systems needed to
perform specialized missions. Considerations in the design of these ships
may involve a trade-off between spare room for rescue and equipping the
ship for specialized missions.

4.3.3.3 Commercial Ships


Tonnage and Compliance with Regulation. The Tonnage Management
Convention (1969) incentivizes ship owners and designers to shrink
enclosed spaces which may be detrimental to safety, comfort and
equipment/machinery spaces. This trade-off between tonnage and safety
raises safety concerns and affects the occupational health and safety of
crew (increases chances of fatigue).



Subdivisions, Redundancy and Cargo Carrying Capacity. SOLAS, as
a constraint, requires ships to have a certain number of subdivisions based
on their length. Naturally, shipowners want ships with larger holds that
can carry cargo efficiently in bulk. It may even be required to construct
bigger ships, taking advantage of economies of scale, without thoroughly
analysing the structural stresses on such large ship. The fracturing into two
and sinking of the MOL Comfort on 11 July 2013, is an example of trading
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off between structural strength for cargo carrying capacity (Bahamas
Maritime Authority, 2015; Jiang, 2015). A trade-off between objectives or
constraints, therefore, leads to an optimal design (Olcer, 2019). The final
design may lean more towards one objective, which may be based on the
decision of a moderator considering owner preferences, marketable
design, route to be used or availability of cargo handling equipment in
ports to be visited. High number of subdivisions balanced with decent crew
accommodation is a feature of PNTL ship design, making them safe.
Additionally, PNTL ships have redundancy in systems (alternative means
of propulsion, steering, navigation and emergency response). However,
redundancy20 takes away cargo carrying capacity from a commercial ship.


Equipment and technology. Accidents caused by over-reliance on
technology have been termed Computer-assisted. These include Radio
Detection and Ranging/ Global Positioning System/ Automatic
Identification System/ Electronic Chart Display Information System
(RADAR/GPS/AIS/ECDIS) collisions or accidents. The 1956 collision
between Andrea Doria and Stockholm, where both ships navigating in
dense fog collided after Andrea Doria misinterpreted the actions of
Stockholm is an excellent case of Radar-assisted collision (Mattsson,
,2003). Similar misinterpretation of GPS and AIS data or false AIS data
could lead to GPS or AIS- assisted collision (NTSB, 1997; Spaans, 2003;
Cockcroft, 2003). An ECDIS-assisted grounding occurred on 14 July 2014
when the ro-ro passenger ferry (ROPAX) Commodore Clipper ran
aground because the crew over-relied on ECDIS (MAIB, 2015; Nielsen,
2016). These show poor application of technology in shipping.
The ergonomics of bridge systems on US warships has been considered as
a contributor to serious collisions because it was challenging to operate
and interpret them (US Navy, 2017a; US Navy, 2017b; Eckstein, 2019;
Villalovos, 2019). Specifically, the collision between the USS McCain and

20

See Glossary for definition of redundancy.
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Alnic was due to the inability of a sailor to properly operate the helm and
throttle controls (US Navy, 2017b) leading to a “Touch-screen assisted
collision”. The need to ensure simplicity in human-technology interface
(Leveson, 2011) should not be traded-off when designing and installing
ship sensors and equipment.

In short, design and construction are determined by the system control power often
without or with limited input of the operator (crew). Therefore, the frontline
operators are trapped to function in a setting and with equipment which may not
be well-suited for the operation of ships.

4.3.4 Analysis of Ship Operation
Ship operations which are considered as the behaviour of ships are analysed
subsequently.
4.3.4.1 Warship Operations


Combat Operations. Warships are primarily designed and operated for
combat. Security may be the essential element in warship operations
though safety is an important factor for successful completion of missions.
It is worrying that warships are regularly colliding or grounding during
exercises in peacetime. Effective consideration for immediate operational
environment and traffic (ie, situational awareness) could improve warship
safety.



Training Exercise. Most Navies and Military organizations conduct
training in line with doctrine (Hebbar, 2019). The common concept is to
train as you would fight. Training is designed to reflect as much of reality
as possible, including the simulation of risks and hazards. This doctrinal
foundation makes warship operations inherently risky and, consequently,
prone to accidents. Inadequately supervised training exercises/ simulations
in the real world environment could lead to costly accidents. Helge Ingstad
had taken unacceptable risk, transiting at 17 knots in a narrow fjord during
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navigational training (Mizokami, 2018b; Wijnen, 2018). Even more
troubling was the absence of the Captain or very experienced navigators
from the bridge during a risky navigational manoeuvre (Newsbreezer,
2018). Additionally, the Italian Frigate Federico Martinengo collided
during training on a night mission (Voytenko, 2019a). These are few
examples of major casualties during training at sea. Strict monitoring of
the environment could have mitigated the risk involved in this training.
4.3.4.2 Commercial Ships Operations.
Commercial ships readily justify their existence by generating revenue when at
sea. The need to deliver cargo at a quicker rate and the desire for higher profit
margins may result in disregard for safety in operation. As such, the need for an
optimal trade-off between maximising efficiency of cargo transport and safety of
ship operations in line with Efficiency Thoroughness Trade Off (ETTO) principle
by Hollnagel (2009).

In short, operational environments and their risks may become secondary because
the control structures expect the fulfilment of its agenda (military training or
commercial pressure) and imposes it on ships’ commanders/masters who usually
do not resist. Such situation may increase risk level of the entire maritime
operation system within a specific environment.

4.4 Emergent Discussions
Though not initially considered as themes in the research, sea time, promotion in
rank and fatigue emerged through discussions and are included herewith.

4.4.1 Analysis of Fatigue
Issues pertaining to fatigue are present in all categories of shipping but have different
dynamics.
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4.4.1.1 Warships and Coast Guard Ships


Manning levels and Rest Hours. Comparatively, warships and CG ships
have large crew sizes. Helge Ingstad had a crew of 137 compared to the
23 of MT Sola TS, though the warship was about 5130 tons and the Tanker
was about 62,000 tons (Mizokami, 2018c; AIBN, 2018). It is interesting
that a tanker more than 10 times the tonnage of a warship had just about
one-sixth its crew. This is understandable because their missions differ:
warships need to continue their operations even when casualties occur
during combat while cargo shipowners tend to minimize operating
expenditures concerning crew.
Despite large crew, fatigue has been known as a contributory factor in
warship accidents. The Captain of Helge Ingstad had his sleep interrupted
four times during the night of the collision (Newsbreezer, 2018) affecting
quality of sleep. Unadjusted watchbill21 scheme also contributed to crew
fatigue in the Fitzgerald, Antietam and McCain accidents (US Navy,
2017a). The US Navy has therefore adopted a circadian rhythm watchbill
scheme (shift system) which considers the routine of the specific ship
involved.

4.4.1.2 Commercial Ships


Manning Levels. The logic behind manning choices is to reduce crew
related expenses. Unsurprisingly, fatigue is considered as a major
contributor to marine casualties (UK MCA, 2016). Though fatigue in the
maritime sector is regulated internationally by IMO (STCW) and ILO
(MLC), the incidence of fatigue among seafarers is currently unabated. As
stated by Bhattacharya (2009) ineffective management by shipping
companies, particularly of the ISM code, may be the cause. Therefore,
more effective management should consider the socio-economic and

21

See Glossary for Watch bill definition.
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organisational factors as well as encourage the participation of seafarers in
safety management.


Underreporting of Rest and Work Hours. Several researchers (Smith,
2007; Lützhöft, Thorslund, Kircher & Gillberg, 2007; Allen, Wadsworth
& Smith, 2008; Grech 2015; Anund A et. al., 2015; Chembukkavu, 2017;
NEPIA, 2017) have suggested that seafarers and shipping companies
underreport rest hours, rendering regulations on rest and fatigue
ineffective. Basically, larger crews on ships would be an effective way to
improve safety.

In short, fatigue both in Navy and Commercial shipping must be properly
recognized and addressed by the authorities having the power to select appropriate
crew quantity and quality as well as to adjust work organization to avoid cognitive
impairment.

4.4.2 Analysis of Promotion
Promotion serves as motivation for various actions which could support the
attainment of an assigned finality or even counterfinality.

4.4.2.1 Warships and Coast Guard Ships
Officers and Sailors on warships are promoted as in most military organizations.
Promotion to senior ranks requires individuals to engage in some level of
interaction with top ranking officials. Promotion of senior officers to top positions
(Commodore and Captain of Capital Warships) in the Navy and CG is authorized
by political authorities. Consideration for promotion includes time served ashore
as well as time served aboard ships.

Watchkeepers are usually required to pass an examination (theory and practical)
before they are promoted to sensitive ship borne appointments. Though a
watchkeeper may pass an examination for a position, they might not have gathered
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the necessary experience. To correct this, the US Navy has abolished the
deployment of Surface Warfare Officers (seafarers) on staff appointments
(LaGrone, 2018). Improperly considered promotion, may lead to appointment of
low-experienced officers as Captain of ships.

4.4.2.2 Commercial Ships
Seafarers on Commercial ships are promoted based on similar criteria. They are
required to obtain Certificates of Competencies which legally require minimum
training and experience. Mostly, seafarers would have gathered the needed
experience since most parts of their career would have been spent onboard the
ship. To comply with shipowners demands or supposed expectations, some
seafarers and captains may engage in unsafe practices such as underreporting rest
hours and disregarding safety management practices.

In short, though promotion of seafarers serves to encourage efficiency, it could
lead to unsafe practices and accidents if wrongly done.

4.4.3 Analysis of Sea Time
Sea time provides all seafarers to build experience and proficiency.

4.4.3.1 Warship and Coast Guard Ships
The lack of adequate experience in operating ship systems and proficient decision
making capability could be the result of lack of adequate sea time. The US and
Norway Navy accidents showed that watchkeepers lacked the capability to take
decisions during critical periods. Mainly these warship versus commercial ship
collisions seemed to be caused by the meeting of inadequately experienced
warship watchkeepers and very fatigued commercial ship watchkeepers. It is
critical to note that lack of experience and fatigue are organizational failures.
Solutions to this problem need to be taken from a system perspective.
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The structure and organisation of Navy or CG institutions make it challenging for
personnel to accrue sufficient time at sea. Comparatively, as at 24 July 2019
Maersk owned 316 ships and operated 730 ships with about 89,000 employees
(Statista, 2019; MoverDB.com, 2019). The US Navy also had 43 ships deployed
on missions and a total of 290 ships with 336,978 personnel (Navy.mil, 2019).
Therefore, warships have high crew-to-ship ratio affecting rotation of personnel
on ships and in watchkeeping functions.

Warship and CG ships supplement inadequate sea time with extensive use of
simulators. However, over-reliance on simulators may erode certain time-tested
practices (looking out of bridge windows or conning from bridge wings) limiting
the ability of seafarers to appreciate real-life scenarios (situational awareness).
Over reliance on simulators or the use of unrealistic simulators may produce
“simulated seafarers”, seafarers who lack the rudiments of navigation.
As pertains to PNTL ships, Navy and CG authorities should consider attaching
seafarers to commercial ships for specific periods of time to build experience in
real operational context.

4.4.3.2 Commercial Ships
Commercial ships spend almost all their time at sea. The longer time at sea
increases exposure to accidents. Due to intensity of commercial activities, ship
maintenance or/and familiarization of newcomers may not be conducted as
expected. Additionally, simulators used for training in Maritime Education and
Training (MET) institutions (RADAR/ARPA/ECDIS/Engine Control Unit
simulator training) are often different from the equipment on board ships. The
seafarer could then be on ships with very different navigational equipment without
prior familiarization.

Therefore, while exposure to real situations at sea may be complicated for military
staff, the incapacity to train prior to joining a ship often affects ability of seafarers
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to properly use shipborne equipment. In both cases, the solution requires the
system and its control structure (management) to determine adequate solutions.

4.5 Recap of Research Questions
To enhance clarity of the findings of the research, a recap of the research questions is as
follows. The key findings and summary of the chapter are structured as the answers to the
research.


How the finality of warship, CG and commercial ships influences ship
design and operation?



Which institutional framework/culture predisposes ships to accidents?



What are the strengths and weaknesses in warships, CG and commercial
ship operations when considered as sub-systems?

4.6 Overview of Key Findings
The key findings of this research are highlighted as follows:
4.6.1 Paramount ownership and mission
Governments/shipowners have been identified as the owners of their respective
systems. They hold power and allocate the main missions. For example:
shareholders hold the legimate power in companies and organize it according to
their needs and believe. In Navy and CG, the power originates from the Ministry
through a military or police structure.
Control mechanisms are developed to ensure that the goals determined by the
owners of the systems are achieved. In each system, the control mechanisms are
organised and distributed differently but their aims remain to control subsystems
and to alter them when deemed necessary.
In maritime domain, the control mechanisms are top-down and hierarchical in
nature (e.g. from ministry of defence to officers then to sailors). Higher
hierarchical levels have ultimate power to modify the missions of each ship
through the allocation of (or not) resources. This therefore enhances or degrades
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safety at any stage of a ships life cycle, from design/construction to operation of
ships.

In short, the finality (missions) of warship, CG and commercial ship are allocated
by owners (Government or shipowners). Owners seem to consider “Mission First”
(Combat, Protection or Profit) above other consideration. This motivates owners
to build and operate ships to mainly achieve allocated missions. Safety may only
be a condition to achieve “Mission First”. Missions, as allocated finality,
determine the design and operation of ships. Ship design and operations are more
inclined to “Mission First” than “Safety First”.
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4.6.2 Institutional framework/culture predisposes ships to accidents
Each of the 3 systems of maritime operations has unique frameworks and cultures.
These frameworks and cultures have been historically and socially determined by
the respective missions of each system.

4.6.2.1 System-Navy
System-Navy has a strict hierarchy to enable effective command and control in
(life-threatening) combat operations. This hierarchy has consequences such as in
training operations:


Military doctrine requires training to be conducted as real-time combat
operations. Such training at sea could lead to taking unacceptable risks.
However, not taking adequate risk mitigation measures, related to the
maritime environment, may create conditions for accidents.



A Can-do culture could generate risk acceptance. Limited government
funds may affect ship maintenance despite requiring ships to operate at
optimal levels. A case in point is the loss of the Argentinean submarine.
Cutbacks can also affect capacity to effectively train crew at sea.

4.6.2.2 System- Coast Guard
System-Coast Guard has similarities with Navy. However, CG crew are usually
more exposed to the sea environment because their missions (police, SAR and
pollution response) occur more frequently (and more often than war). So, CG crew
are regularly mobilized in to conduct real operations causing them to acquire
adaptive and reactive skills which are needed in operation at sea. The attainment
of CG goals, through operations, is readily seen by the public and concerned
authorities. Consequently, budgetary cuts immediately affecting the capacity of
the CG units to perform their missions may trigger public outcry.
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4.6.2.3 Systems-Shipping
System-shipping is internationally regulated. These regulations provide a network
of measures to mitigate uncontrolled race toward profit-making. However, the
regulations are not exempt from loopholes. For instance, reduced manning levels
for cost efficiency causes crew to over work, creates fatigue and possible
accidents. Ineffective safety management, blame culture and job insecurity may
limit feedback and lead to unsafe practices and accidents.
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4.6.3 Strengths and weaknesses of warships, CG and commercial ships
operations
Though the research commenced with this idea, it was soon realised that it is
shallow to attempt a comparison. Each ship relates to a specific system and
operates within a unique context. It signifies that different networks of interactions
exist and affect each ship differently. Additionally, each vessel is subject to
different orders (levels as shown in Figure 4) of finality (purpose).
Therefore, the research cannot compare the sectors but rather gives insight into
understanding these categories of maritime operations and their safety limitations
which are inherent to the system they are in.

However, it is good to study the best safety practices used in the three categories
of shipping to cross-fertilise ideas. This should be done by adapting the practices
to best-fit the particular context and environment of maritime operations.

4.7 Summary of Chapter Four
Each subsystem-ship interacts with the entire system and its parts. Ship operations
are related to the system structure and functioning because the system and its
control mechanisms determine how the ships are designed, built and operated.
Therefore, numerous reciprocal interactions exist between ships and systems.
Each ship category exists in its own system and cannot be studied in isolation or
compared one by the other.

The interaction between ships and their respective system has to be understood
particularly in relation to safety. As safety is an emergent property of a system
(Leveson, 2011), enhancing safety requires studying the system as a whole within
its environment and contexts.
Due to the uniqueness of each system, importing ready-made solutions could be
counter-productive if not preliminary absorbed and adapted to the system’s
specificities and constraints.
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Notably, none of the three subsystems under consideration can be considered as a
reference for the others but each of them can inspire better practices.

The control mechanism of PNTL ships has been designed to ensure maximum
safety of ships. The overall PNTL system is committed to safeguard ships in
operation. Resources are mobilized to achieve this finality and it is achieved by
enhanced ship design and optimized crewing and operation. This satisfies the
unstated mission to preserve by all means the reputation of the nuclear industry
while ensuring that no ships are involved in accidents.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND SYSTEMIC SUGGESTIONS
5.0 Introduction
This final Chapter concludes the work and provide some systemic suggestions.

5.1 Conclusion of Research Work
Finality, behaviour and control mechanisms were the main systems thinking
principles used in the analysis. The analyses were structured according to a matrix
of goal, action, model and Observability conditions. Emergent discussions were
also analysed and deductions made leading to key findings.

In a simplified analysis, the trend of warships versus commercial ships accidents
seems related to insufficient experience of warship watchkeepers and fatigued
commercial ship watchkeepers.
As pertains in PNTL ships, which have allocated and achieved finality of “Safety
First”, inexperienced or fatigued watchkeepers do not exist because the system
behaves to avoid such risky situations.

The application of systems thinking in this research revealed that accidents were
caused by interactions between elements in the system and subsystems. It also
showed that the safety of a system is influenced by its context and environment.
The importance of a comprehensive and properly organised higher institutional
framework should not be ruled out. These validate systems thinking as a potent
tool to investigate operations of Navy, CG and Commercial shipping in order to
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improve their safety. Further research in this topic is necessary to enhance the
validity of systems thinking in safety improvement.
The following suggestions complement the conclusion by providing directions of
analysis and further research.

5.2 Suggestions on Changing System Behaviour to Enhance Safety
This novel research has uncovered some practicable ideas capable of addressing
some challenges in maritime operations, which are deeply embedded in system
functioning.

Regardless, the studied systems of maritime operations have built stock over time
which has created system inertia. Therefore, major system modifications may not
be easy. However, some minor changes in a system, in appropriately chosen areas,
may generate major modifications.

Forester, as cited in Meadows (2008), asserts that to enable system changes,
leverage points need to be identified and used. Leverage points are places in
systems where a relatively small change can cause large alterations.

Improving safety will require adjusting elements of the system. In this respect,
Meadows (2008) proposed 12 factors to be considered in order to alter system
behaviour. Each factor requires different levels of commitment. The factors are
on a scale which increases from 12 to 1:


In factor 12, the changes are easy to accept (so easy to implement) but
have marginal impacts.



In factor 1, modifications require structural adjustments which are
challenging to initiate but may trigger major effects on system behaviour.

These recommendations are considered in System-Navy as it is the main concern
in this exploratory work. For each factor, numerous adjustments may exist but
selected examples are given due to research limitations. Extensive analysis to
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adjust each factor would require intense work and the contribution of Navy
stakeholders to identify and select the best options. However, that is beyond the
scope of this research.

Factor 12
Numbers – Constants

Meaning in Context of Navy

and parameters.
Change the numbers of



elements in the system.

Iincreasing redundancy to overcome deficient
elements (technical, procedural, human, etc.).



Increasing time at sea for watchkeepers.



Increasing navy budget to ensure optimal
maintenance, training and sufficient periods at sea
for each ship and crewmember.



Modify procedures for appointing watchkeepers
(e.g. to favour longer sea time).

Factor 11
Buffers – The sizes of
stabilizing

Meaning in Context of Navy

stocks

relative to their flow.
Stocks stabilize system

Too big a buffer, such as isolated Navy culture,

but

makes a system rather inflexible and liable to fail.

increase

their

inertia.

There is the need to manage stocks and flows of
new ideas and cultures.


Integrating STCW requirements in naval training
could influence safety culture.
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Factor 10
Stock-and-Flow

Meaning in Context of Navy

Structures – Physical
systems and their nodes
of intersection.
Optimal

construction

and



efficient

Create mutual flow of safety ideas (best practices)
between Navy and other military forces as well as

management of resource

with Navy and Commercial shipping.

flow increases safety of



Consider ergonomics of navigation equipment.

the system



Enhance comfort on warship to reduce fatigue.
Though stock and flow changes can improve
warship safety, systems take time to change.

Factor 9
Delay – the lengths of

Meaning in Context of Navy

time related to the rate
of system changes
Delay
required

suggests
to

time



absorb

Estimate time to train watchkeepers according to
STCW if considered in novel training scheme in

changes at appropriate

Navy.

without



Manage crew fatigue by adjusting watchbills.

destabilizing the system.



Installation of new equipment should require time

moment

to train people.
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Factor 8
Balancing

Feedback

Meaning in Context of Navy

Loops
Feedback required for



system equilibrium or
ensuring

goal-seeking

objective.

Reporting of incident and accidents should be
effective to indicate areas for improvement.



Feedback

Crew fatigue, health, recreation and socialization
should be constantly monitored to ensure crew

loop to verify the system

efficiency.

is in appropriate track.

Feedback to achieve the system goal is good but
feedback to rapidly improve it is better.

Factor 7
Reinforcing

Feedback

Meaning in Context of Navy

Loops
Self-improving



feedback.

Near miss reporting should be incentivized to
reinforce feedback from onboard safety.



Safety performance and experience at sea should
prevail in promotion to ship officer appointment.



Ships with good safety records should be given
recognition.
Strengthening safety-related feedback should be
promoted. High safety performance should be
appreciated. Both would demonstrate the focus of
the institution on safety.
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Factor 6
Information Flows

Meaning in Context of Navy

Where information goes



and who gets the right

hierarchy gap.


information.

Facilitates communication beyond traditional

Promote unusual reporting systems such as
anonymous

feedback

with

whistleblowers

protections.


Enhance transparency such as information flow,
decisions, budgets, etc.

Factor 5
Rules

–

Incentives,

Meaning in Context of Navy

punishments,
constraints.
“The rules of the system



Develop rules considering “Safety First” during

define its scope, its

peacetime training and non-combat missions even

boundaries

when against the doctrine. Avoid Can-do culture

and

its

degrees of freedom.”

in peace time.


Establish an independent safety department.



Consider new rules and transparent mechanisms
for promotion of staff throughout their carrier.



Create rules on accident investigation (e.g. open
investigation to non-navy staff) and transparent
distribution of reports.



Consider rules to eliminate blame-culture.



Provide

complain

procedures

confidentiality of reporting.
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and

ensure

Factor 4
Self-Organisation

Meaning in Context of Navy

Adaptation

and



Empower all crewmembers in ship safety.

restructuring

for



Allow crew and stakeholders to construct safety

resilience.

(e.g. decisions related to ship design, appointment
of staff and operation)


Allow

ship

command

and

crew

to

take

autonomous safety decision.

Factor 3
Goals – the purpose or

Meaning in Context of Navy

function of the system.


Identify the achieved finality and not allocated
finality by assessing behavior of the overall
system.



Assess the importance of experience at sea in
promotion to ship command positions.



Review privileges in resource allocations.



Question the meaning of Navy in peace time and
its goals in such context.
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Factor 2
Paradigms – the mind-

Meaning in Context of Navy

set in which the system
arises
Fundamental

mind-set



Question if Navy should participate in income

or deep understanding

generation

of a system. Unstated

activities

assumptions

of

a



systems’ foundation.

by

multiplying

its

commercial

Consider the stability of employment in Navy and
outsource

functions

such

as

navigation,

maintenance, catering, etc. Special arrangements
should be made for wartime.


Consider novel ship design to extend operational
profile:

war,

CG

and

limited

commerce

(feeder/breakbulk services with navy auxiliary
vessels).


Design warship with wood and sails. This reduces
operational cost and allows longer time at sea.



Enhance management and high management
responsibility regime. As in the philosophy of
Jonas (1984), power implies responsibility.



Explore the possibility of reporting serious safety
issues to MoD/Prime Minister’s office without
passing through Navy filter.



Modify the command system on ships to be based
on competency and experience more than rank.



Think ship operation and crew as an organic
structure and not a mechanical structure.
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Factor 1
Transcending

Meaning in Context of Navy

Paradigms
Flexibility

in



Question the Navy model in use (former colonies have
imported models)?

transcending paradigms.


The necessity of Navy functions in the current era of
weapon systems?



The employment of Navy in meeting a nation’s
maritime needs?



Consider the transformation of Navy into another type
of force to enforce law, ensure security and protect
national interest at sea.



Consider the meaning of Navy as a tool for power
projection in the hand of a higher system which is the
State.



Consider a system which positions safety of crew
before the accomplishment of the mission, specifically
in peacetime. This should be reviewed in wartime.

5.3 Research Contribution to Knowledge
This research tested systems thinking in an exploratory study of warship, CG and
commercial ship safety. It has highlighted the value of the approach by
demonstrating the link between subsystem-ship functioning and safety with the
control mechanism in shipping/CG/navy systems. It has provided some areas of
investigation to enhance safety in relation to warship operations.

5.4 Recommendation from Research
Further research is required to validate the findings and examine in-depth the
factors of change briefly introduced in the work.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
Glossary of Terms
Achieved Finality means the purpose or goal(s) actually attained by a system through behaviour.
Allocated (stated) Finality means the purpose or goal which a system is supposed to achieve
through behaviour. A system may not achieve its allocated finality and could even achieve a
counterfinality (negating purpose).
Captain is the generic name for a leader of any size of ship. In this work, Captain means the
commander of a warship or CG ship who is of a senior rank in the military/CG.
Coast Guard Cutter is a Coast Guard vessel 65 feet in length or greater, having accommodation
for a crew.
Commanding Officer (CO) is a military officer in command of a military vessel or shore
establishment.
Commercial Shipping means the act or means of transporting goods by sea for a fee. Usually a
business entity driven by profit and uses ships as its main tool.
Corvette is usually a small, manoeuvrable and lightly armed warship. It is differentiated by size
or displacement; usually between 55-100 m long or 550- 2790 tons22. It is smaller than the average
Frigate but bigger than coastal crafts and missile boats. However, some modern Corvettes may be
similar in size to a Frigate.
Coxswain is a person or senior non-commissioned officer in-charge of a ship’s boat and crew
which are under the Command of an officer and particularly responsible for steering the boat or
even a ship. This title is popularly used on warships.
Destroyer means a heavily armed, fast, manoeuvrable warship with long-endurance which escorts
larger lesser armed warships or convoys to protect them against attack from other warships.
Destroyers are the main surface combatant warships. They have multi-sensors and have antisubmarine capability. They may be about 120-160 m long or about 9000 tons.
Divisional System is the system of organising the crew or company of warships into smaller
groups often based on trade or mess deck. On warships it is usually commanded by a junior officer
with the aim of improving discipline, welfare and running of the ship’s routine. It is also a
leadership, communication and systems for command and control and for addressing personnel
grievances.

22

https://www.wrightys-warships.com/corvette.html
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Executive Officer (XO) is the Second in-Command of a warship who aids, deputises and reports
directly to the Commanding Officer or Captain. He is responsible for the daily, efficient and safe
running of the ship. He is usually a navigator or a deck officer.
Feedback Loop is a closed chain of causal connections from a stock, through a set of decisions or
rules or physical laws or actions that are dependent on the level of the stock, and back again
through a flow to change the stock.
Flag Officer Fleet is usually a senior naval officer of the rank or Commodore or Rear Admiral,
who is in Command of a group of warships assigned to him. The CO/Captains of these ships report
directly to him. He is responsible for the operational deployment, maintenance, safety and security
of the ships as well as the discipline and welfare of the crew.
Flows are the mechanism of operation in systems, which drive interactions through
interconnections. They bind systems and enable communication.
Frigate is a warship highly specialised in anti-air warfare though it may have anti-submarine
capability. It is similar to but lager than a corvette and smaller than a Destroyer. Frigate design,
role and size vary widely.
Group Think a way of thinking which leads to self-deception of safety, involuntary consenting
to group decision and conforming to the values and ethics of a group.
Hierarchy is the arrangement of aggregation of subsystems to form systems. Subsystems also
have internal hierarchies, which enables them to regulate, maintain and take care of themselves.
Larger systems coordinate and enhance the functioning of the subsystems as stable, resilient and
efficient structures. Meanwhile, subsystems serve the needs of the larger systems. Hierarchical
systems evolve from bottom up. The purpose of the upper layers of the hierarchy is to serve the
purposes of the lower layers.
Inertia is the apparent delay, buffer or shock absorbers in systems reaction to inputs, influences
or changes in interactions.
Maritime Operations are activities and actions conducted with the aim of achieving the purposes
of Warships, Coast Guard and Commercial ships. The term used in this work mainly covers
Warship, Coast Guard and Commercial ship operations. Maritime operations include; combat
operations, navigation, security operations, safety inspections and operations, transport of cargo
and search and rescue.
Master is a senior ranking mariner who has overall command of ship. The ultimate responsibility
for the safety, efficiency, seaworthiness, cargo operation and compliance with regulations lies with
the Master.
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Ministry of Defence (MoD) is the government agency responsible for maintaining an active and
effective Armed Force for the Defence of a State. MoD formulates national defence and security
strategies, issues policies and provides resources for the attainment of strategic goals.
Naval Headquarters (NHQ) the highest command, control and administrative establishment in a
Navy. It is responsible for the modelling of naval operations, safety, maintenance, deployment and
manning of ships.
Operations are acts, processes or ways of operating or group of activities conducted to achieve an
aim.
Petty Officer is a naval rank for a non-commissioned officer superior to seamen (ordinary, able,
leading) but junior to Chief Petty Officers. They are usually heads of Departments under the
Divisional System and supervise men junior to them in rank.
Redundancy is the addition of extra components and channels of information to the critical ones
in use in order to enhance the reliability and damage survivability of a system.
Resilience is the ability to bounce or spring back into shape or position after being pressed or
stretched. It is measure of a system’s ability to survive and persist or recover from perturbation
within a variable environment.
Safety I means the ability of a system to function successfully under differing conditions, by
reducing the number of harmful outcomes (accidents / incidents / near misses) to as low as
possible. Safety-I is achieved by making sure that things do not go wrong, either by reducing the
causes of malfunctions and hazards, or mitigating effects.
Safety II means the ability of a system to function successfully under differing conditions, by
raising the number of purposed outcomes to as high as possible. Safety-II is achieved by making
as many things as possible go right, rather than by preventing them from going wrong.
Self-organization is the capacity of systems to structure themselves, to create new structures, to
learn, diversify, and complexify.
Shipping is used with the same meaning as commercial shipping.
Stock is the memory of the history of changing flows within the system.
System are collections of elements or parts of a whole coherently organized with patterns of
interconnection or structure that produces a characteristic set of behaviour, usually classified as its
function or purpose or finality. Systems behaviour could be adaptiveness, goal-seeking, resilience,
self-organisation or evolutionary behaviour. Key concepts in systems are flow, stock, delay,
feedback and wholeness. The Systems described in this research are System-Navy, System-CG
and System-Shipping which represent Navy, CG and Shipping as systems.
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Subsystems are the components of systems or the elements that make up system. The behaviour
and functions of these subsystems contribute to overall systems behaviour and function.
Interactions between subsystems also produce emergent properties that are different from mere
summations of these subsystems. Subsystems are also made up of elements which function in a
systemic view. Subsystem-ships discussed in this work are Subsystem-Warship, Subsystem- CG
ship and Subsystem- commercial ship as part of their respective Navy, CG and Shipping Systems.
Submarine is a unique type of warship capable of submerging and conducting combat operations
underwater for long periods (about 3 months or more). It usually attacks surface ships with
torpedoes of attack other submarines. Few submarines are capable of firing missiles (Nuclear).
Thick description means describing the thinking, planning and intentionality behind the research work
in its context of the maritime world. Thick description seeks to show the social relations, motivations
and emotions of researchers and participants in a research but not just a mere accumulation of details of
research data. A researcher employing Thick description is required to describe and interpret observed
social behaviours and actions within the specific research context.
Watchbill is a table containing a list of officers and crew of a ship, their work stations and special
duties.
Wholeness an entity containing all parts (without any component) and made up of interrelated
parts forming a complete entity.
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Appendix 2
TRANSCRIPTION OF FOCUS GROUP WITH COMMENTS
PART 1 – OWNERSHIP AND MISSION (High Level Control System and Finality)
WARSHIP
1.
2.
3.
4.

State (2).
Ministry of Defense (2).
Government (2).
Naval support by third party
country (1).

COAST GUARD SHIP
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

OWNER
6.

State (2).
Ministry of Interior (2).
Ministry of Defense (2).
Government (2).
Alternative ownership to
complete
specific
missions (SAR, oil spill,
etc.)
NGO/Mutualship
–
ownership of specific
missions, ie, Swedish Sea
Rescue Society in Search
and Rescue services.
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COMMERCIAL SHIP
1.

2.

Privately owned company
by an individual or
shareholders
(3).
Difference between these
types of systems occurs
during decision making.
State owned or supported
(2). It could be privately
operated and based on
profit/position in the
world.

1.
2.

3.
4.
MISSION

NB

5.

6.
a.

Navy &
Coast
Guard
could both
be tasked
to protect
the State.
Missions
could be
subcontrac
ted.

b.

7.
8.

MILITARY RESPONSE
War (2).
Projection of national power and
interests abroad and international
waters (2).
Combatting and other types of
military operations (1).
Defence against military action
from other states.
Protection of national waters
against external aggression even
in peril.
Offensive Operations.
Conduct long range operations
(Poise).
Secondary missions; counter
piracy, disaster relief, peace
enforcement operations.
Sea blockade
Commercial
ship
Escort
operations.

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

POLICE RESPONSE
Law enforcement (3).
Search and Rescue (could
be shared among all 3
classifications) (3).
Pollution
prevention
/response (2).
Escort duties/ operations
(2).
Maritime
Regulatory
functions
Emergency Response.
Defense of Territory
(National waters).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

PROFIT
Profit and trade (3).
Transportation of goods
(3).
Survive as a business
venture.
Research / survey.
Services (Hospital, etc).

Description and Comments
Ownership and control as reported by participants
Governments or states are the usual owners of Warship and Coast Guard ships. Specifically,
Ministries of Defence are the main government organizations which own warships. Coast Guard
ships may be under the ownership of the Ministry of Interior or Defence.
Commercial ships are mostly privately owned companies by individuals or shareholders.
Commercial ships may also be state owned. A privately owned company may be owned by
individuals or other entities (integrate in groups).
In some case there is a distinction between ownership and control in Navy, CG and Commercial
shipping as some function may be outsourced. In this respect, state may subcontract the some
functions of the Navy to another country through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU);
especially when it has no capability to own a Navy (A protectorate, colony or failed state). Equally,
some Coast Guard missions may be subcontracted. This is the concept in which Search and Rescue
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(SAR) functions are performed by the Swedish Sea Rescue Society and similar organizations in
other countries (e.g. Germany, UK, France, etc.). Finally, cargo ships can be owned by one
company (e.g. a bank) but effectively controlled and operated by a nexus of other companies
(shipmanagers, operators, charterers, etc.).

Mission of ships according to participants
As State owned systems, navy and CG vessels are primarily engaged in State protection missions.
Navy protects State from external aggression and CG protects State from internal or coastal risks.
The main mission of warships is maritime warfare operations to protect the national waters against
external aggressors. It also involves offensive operations as part of projecting a nations power
oversees into international and hostile territory. A full suite of military operations (military
response) originate from this overarching mission such as counter piracy, counter terrorism, antinarcotics trade, sea blockade and commercial ship escort operations. The military in peace time
may perform missions requiring it to provide assistance to civil authority such as Search and
Rescue, peace support operations and disaster relief missions. Missions of warships imply behind
exposed eventually to two categories of risks. The first category relates to marine environment
(weather, piracy, etc.) and a second category of risks relates to combat operations and their
implication in conducting the vessel. Though warships are be prepared for these missions.
Coast Guard ships engage in missions in maritime domain which are typical police response
operations. The main missions involve maritime law enforcement and emergency response
operations. These include border control, traffic alleviation, SAR, pollution prevention and
response, disaster relief and defence of national territories/waters. Coast Guard missions may also
be in support of military missions.
On another hand, commercial ships exist, historically, to generate profit to their owners by
transporting good by sea. Commercial ships may be involved in survey, research, hospital or
medical services and migrant rescue. The case of State owned company may be different.
Originally, they were created to support national trade and independence. Profit-making was
essential but secondary. This mission of making profit may be the element causing shipping
companies to accept high levels of risk and trade-off safety.
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PART 2 – CREW ( SOCIAL SYSTEM)
WARSHIP

COAST

GUARD

COMMERCIAL

SHIP
Crew as a whole:

CREW
AS A
WHOLE
CREW
AS
INDIVID
UALS

SHIP

Crew as a whole:
Medium sized crew

Crew as a whole is

1.

Large sized crew (3).

2.

Same nationality (3).

3.

Bureaucracy and hierarchy

2.

Same nationality (3).

rarely of only one

(2).

3.

Crew is specifically

nationality.

4.

1.

1.

(3).

multinational (2).
2.

Strict compliance with chain

trained for emergency

of command (2).

response and highly

most areas and less

5.

Specialization.

specialized jobs. This

specialized

6.

Combat constraints Special

training

training.

teams for specific emergency

national

response.

multinational (3).

7.

Crew as a whole has a Safety
First mantra.

4.

As

a

could

be
or

whole

3.

Crew as a whole is

General training in

4.

Small size crew.

5.

Flexible

career

patterns

mainly

is

organized in a vertical

based on voyage

hierarchy.

contracts.
6.

Multi-tasking

of

crew.
7.

Less division in
task execution.
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Crew as individual:
1.

Crew as individuals:

Loyalty (Influenced by salary,

1.

patriotism) (2).
2.

Specialized training (2).

3.

Minimum training in other

2.

fields.

Crew

as

Loyalty; salary and

individuals

is

job satisfaction (2).

trained according

Specialized

training

and tasking of crew.
3.

1.

to STCW.
2.

Broader

Loyalty driven by
social

4.

Social stability.

responsibilities

5.

Special disciplinary codes.

ship operations due to

6.

May be defended by military

wider

in liability cases. Crew as

operations.

violations

Training in multiple

abuses.

individuals face high levels of

7.

4.

in

conditions

scope

operations.

normal in military service.

Dependent

Regulated career pattern with

national standards.
5.

8.

Contract with Government.

9.

Specialized tasks for crew.

10. High

divisions

in

task

More

likely

to

speak up against

4.
on

and

Large
responsibilities.

5.

May be civilian or
military.

6.

3.

of

fatigue; but is seen to be

minimum sea service.

of employment.

Effective in multitasking.

6.

Legal liability.

May be defended by
authorities in liability

execution.

cases.
7.

As

individuals

are

employed in Public
service.
8.

Regulated

career

pattern with minimum
sea service.
9.

Contract

with

Government.

Description and Comments on Crew/ Crewing
Shipping as a socio-technical system, currently requires people to operate it. A critical aspect of
this system is the crew borne on ships. Crewing of ships is determined by the Controller/Owner
who manages the crew and determines recruitment standards, training, organization, career
progression, promotion and other terms of employment contract. Issues with crew could be
discussed in the view of crew as individuals and crew as a whole.
Crew are usually selected and recruited as individuals, who have basic training. This training is
supplemented by Shipping Company, Naval and Coast Guard training to build the level of
capability required of crew of to operate the relevant ships. Distinctively, Naval and Coast Guard
crew have same nationality and trained based on national or multinational standards. This is similar
to the practice on PNTL ships. Commercial ships have multinational crew whose training is based
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on International Maritime Organisation (IMO) standards (STCW). Onboard training is conducted
for the crew after joining the ships. Warships, Coast Guard and Commercial ships train and operate
at an acceptably safe level. Commercial ships use Safety Management Systems while Warship and
Coast Guard ships follow Standard Operating Procedures. Though Navy and Coast Guards have
policies and SOPs on individual crew training, the differences between that training and STCW
training may have contributed to the trend of warship/commercial ships accidents. This ideology
is supported by the US Navy’s policy to train its sailors according to the STCW standards (US
Navy, 2017a; LaGrone, 2018 June 29). Training of crew develops the capability of crew members
but this occurs overtime. Time considerations should be factored in the training of individual crew
members. Premature deployment of crew, without sufficient time to build experience, could be
result in human-error caused accidents.
At the center of the discussion on safety of ships, are issues of manning levels which are key
determinant of human element issues mainly fatigue. Basically, higher manning levels or larger
crews creates lesser concerns with fatigue while smaller crews cause more issues of fatigue due to
more work load (Rothblum, et al, 2000). Commercial ships have relatively smaller crew sizes due
to the desire to cut cost involved in paying seafarer salaries and allowances causing fatigue. Fatigue
is known to have caused some major ship accidents (Exxon Valdez, Royal Majesty, Star Princess,
Jambo and Eagle Otome) negative unintended effect of high cases of fatigue among seafarers
resulting in accidents and a greater loss of revenue for ship owners (Smith et al., 2003; Strauch,
2015). Reduction in crew size leading to increased workload and seafarer fatigue was an identified
cause of the Exxon Valdez grounding (Exarchopoulos et al., 2018). Contrarily, Warships and Coast
Guard ships have larger crew sizes due to the need for redundancy in operations and high
specialization in crew tasks. This larger crew sizes should normally translate to lesser cases of
fatigue. However, due to poor crew management practices, excesses in simulation of training
scenarios and poor safety management systems, Warship and Coast Guard crew also suffer cases
of fatigue and accidents. Additionally, military and police establishments maintain a culture of
performing under extreme states of tiredness and fatigue which encourages causes fatigue to exist
in these organizations. Optimal manning levels with effective safety management systems are ideal
in ensuring ship safety as practiced by PNTL ships. PNTL ships have two crews (sailing and standby crew) for each ship ensuring each crew member is properly rested and ships are adequately
manned.
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PART 3 – DESIGN OF SHIP (TECHNICAL SYSTEM)
WARSHIP
1.
2.

COAST GUARD SHIP

Strengthened hull and

1.

High speed (3).

structures (3).

2.

Mission purpose-built (2).

Volume is quantified as

weapons,

3.

Special capabilities.

profit

weapon

4.

Heavy weather characteristics.

optimized for profit (3).

large

5.

Mostly diesel engines.

ammunition storage (3).

6.

Designed for medium ranged

(GT), light and loaded

coastal operations.

displacement (2).

Heavy
sophisticated
systems

3.

4.

5.

and

High

speed

DESIGN
OF SHIP

2.

3.

Maximized cargo space.
so

space

Regulated

is

tonnage

7.

Ice breakers.

Camouflage

(grey)

8.

For rescue operations.

distance

colour / stealth shaped

9.

Smaller in size.

(intercontinental trade).

design (flare shape of

10. Mostly of white colour.

hull) (3).

11. Smaller weapons.

Highly

12. Comply

4.

Designed

Large

for

and

with

national

regulations.

Cost efficient.

6.

Complies

with

international

High

14. Diverse size and design of ship

regulations.

Multiple Command and

(specialized

Control Stations. Engine

firefighting,

room redundancy with

response, etc).

high

power

engines (Diesel,

gas,

nuclear, which can be
combined

for

higher

vessels
oil

complex

5.

13. Shallow drafted ships.

redundancy.

longer

engine rooms.

more subdivisions (2).

multiple

for

7.

Optimization of profit.

pollution

8.

Classification

15. Lighter weapons.

society

compliant.
9.

Regulated living and

16. Highly hydrodynamic hull.

working

17. Communication and detection

(accommodation).

systems

speeds) (3).
7.

1.

maneuverability (3).

compartmentalized/
6.

COMMERCIAL SHIP

spaces

10. Constrained

by

international regulations

Water and air

tight

(highly

compartment.

regulated

ie,

SOLAS).

8.

Large accommodation.

11. Ship-port interface (ie;

9.

Many different sizes and

ramps, cranes, etc).

designs.

No

12. Deeper drafted/ bigger

international regulation
on

design

sized.

standards.

13. Focus

on

energy

Nationally designed and

efficient ships / low

built.

pollution ships.

10. Large

fuel

efficient

for

capacity

14. Regulated

military

redundancy

in ship systems.

missions.

15. Regulated

11. Full type + combine.

environmentally
friendly design.
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12. Reliable

(Performance

16. Runs on Heavy Fuel Oil;

in damaged state).

requiring

13. Reduced complexity.

equipment to use in

14. Complies with national

propulsion.

regulations.
15. Highly

auxiliary

17. Specialized vessels.

hydrodynamic

18. Design influenced by

with block coefficient of

gigantism, making use

about 0.6.

of economies of scale.

16. Long range detection
capacity
(surface/subsurface).
17. Supply capacity.
18. Medical/

Infirmary

capacity.
19. Specialized firefighting
system.
20. Communication
detection

/
capacity

(advanced).
21. Low noise / vibration
design (subs).
22. Diesel

oil/

nuclear

propelled.

Description and Comments on ship design
Warships Design
Warship are mostly designed with high redundancy, high survivability in damaged conditions,
sustained performance in extreme conditions, heavy weapons, sophisticated weapon systems and
large ammunition storage capacity. These ships are also noted for high speed manoeuvrability,
high compartmentalization, hydrodynamic, camouflaged colour and stealth design, and high
redundancy in systems and design. Basically, warships are designed for war; making heavy
weapons and high compartmentalization critical aspects of the ship. The design of warships is
constrained by regulations which are mostly national and ship specific in nature. Other constraints
include available technology on the market, traditions and conventions in warship design. The
decision to settle on a specific warship design is taken through a process of trade-offs amongst
desirable elements. Trade-offs affecting the safety of ships are of utmost concern.
Warship are designed and built with high redundancy to enable them function in cases of combat
damage to one of the systems and to enable supplemented performance during high risk operations.
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Having an operations room supplementing the functions of a navigational bridge serves as support
and safety check on ship operations. A warship could have a combination of diesel, electric of gas
turbines which enable it to attain higher speeds during critical periods. However, redundancy in
systems puts demands on resources which might be limited. Multiple engine types in one ship may
result in extra cost and sacrificing of spaces which could be used for crew accommodation.
Therefore, the need for safety causes a trade-off between crew accommodation and amenities and
desire for redundancy.

Coast Guard Ship Design
Design and construction of coast guard ship depends highly on its use. A Coast Guard cutter
resembles a commercial ship design while a fast rescue or patrol vessel may resemble a warship.
Decisions on trade-off in design and construction of coast guard ships are constrained by national
regulations and technology. Coast Guard ships are diverse and usually specialized in designs such
as icebreakers or shallow-drafted vessels and even vessels with heavy weather characteristics.

Commercial Ship Design
Commercial ships design has been drastically affected by gigantism, economies of scale and
technology with the overarching aim of making profits. Generally, commercial ships are more
box-shaped, deep drafted, have cargo handling equipment, maximized cargo carrying capacity,
aesthetically designed and fitted with environmentally friendly equipment. Though, commercial
ship design has been focused on energy efficiency and reducing environmental pollution, these
ships have long used heavy fuel oil which causes pollution. Additionally, commercial ships are
known to have high block co-efficient (0.84 for a 172000 Bulk Carrier) which makes them
relatively less hydrodynamic and energy efficient (Choi et al, 2010). Regardless of the design
concept, commercial ship design is strictly regulated internationally. Commercial ships vary in
design and operation depending on the aspect of maritime trade they are built for. Decision on
what aspects of such ships to focus is affected by trade-off between most desirable qualities.
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PART 4 – CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
WARSHIP

COAST

GUARD

COMMERCIAL SHIP

SHIP
1.

Training,

exercises

and drills (2).
2.

Coastal

1.

SAR (2).

1.

Transport of cargo (2).

2.

Law

enforcement

2.

Bunkering operations.

crime

3.

Assistance to ships and

functions/

and

interdiction (2).

persons

3.

littoral operations.
Supply operations.

3.

Oil spill response.

encountered.

4.

Escort

4.

Drug interdiction.

ships.

5.

Anti-piracy.

just-in time arrivals, slow

6.

Emergency

steaming, trim optimization

response.

and

OPERATI

mercantile

ONS AT

5.

Preparing for war.

SEA

6.

Supports

SAR,

emergency response,
crime

7.

interdiction

Surveillance
operations.

and

research

operations, etc.
7.

Survey

4.

Construction

distress

if

Energy efficient operation;

weather

optimized

routes.
5.

operations.
8.

in

Shipping operations; as link
in world trade.

and

6.

Clinical services.

servicing of aids to

7.

Dredging operations.

navigation.

8.

Salvage operations.

9.

Offshore

drilling

and

support operations.

Description and Comment
Warships mainly conduct combat operations in defence of territorial waters or offensive action to
project national interest in international waters or overseas territories. Other operations include
support of commercial ships; as escorts through high threat (piracy prone) waters, keeping sea
lanes of communication open and patrols to ensure the general protection of ships in national
waters. Emergency response, crime interdiction operation and sea evacuation of stranded persons
are also included in the array of naval operations. Though most warships conduct frequent and
nearly continues training for combat operations, real-life combat operations do not occur often.
This translates to Navies spending lots of time training for combat missions rather than actually
engaging in these missions.
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PART 5 – EMERGENT DISCUSSIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF SHIP SAFETY
Coast Guard Ship

Warship

Commercial
Ship

1.

Not

internationally

Not

internationally

regulated but managed

regulated but managed

with customary 4 hours

by customary 4 hours

shift

shift work system.

system

(watch

Internationally
regulated.

system).
FATIGUE

2.

HQ

policy

instructions

and
guide

fatigue regulation.
3.

Owner regulated.

1.

Political (Not partisan

1.

politics but you need to
be seen as hardworking

2.

and effective).
2.

Impressive

career

3.

performance.
3.

PROMOTIONS

Political (Commission

1.

Time at sea.

on appointment).

2.

Need

to

be

Need to have a good

recognized

by

network.

peers

Same as that in the

Captains

Navy.

officers).

Years of service not

3.

(certified

sea time.

competent).

Promotion examination.

5.

Not fully dependent on

4.

7.

5.
on

Promoted based

superior’s

Could

be

promoted at sea

assessment.

in

different

Trust in-confidence of

capacities.

President/Cabinet/Minis
ter.
8.

Regardless,
defined

a

more

promotion

process.
TIME AT SEA

1.

Satisfies operational

as

on necessity.

sea time.
Based

and

STCW

necessarily a specified

4.

6.

(other

1.

Satisfies requirements

(Time spent

requirements or mission

(patrols and

underway and

(training for war and

enforcement of

making way)

patrolling).

regulations).
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1.

More time at
sea.

2.

Motivated by
trade/profit.

2.

3.

4.

Estimate for developing

2.

Estimate for

3.

Nearly at sea

countries – 2 months at

developed countries –

everyday (10-

sea/year.

4 to 6 months.

11 months).

Estimate for developing

3.

Sail on demand

countries – 4 to 6

(SAR) and may cause

months.

direct loss of money.

Sea time causes direct

4.

4.

Gains money
while at sea.

Resource constrained.

loss of money to state.
5.

Sea time constrained by
resources.

NB. Nuclear submarines
spend 4 months at sea/
year.

Description and Comments
Though not considered as key part of the discussion, certain important topics which concerned
safety emerged. The topics were spontaneously volunteered by respondents who though such
topics were crucial aspects of ship safety and could unveil answers to questions posed by this
research. Safety is an emergent property of shipping systems and can only be described and
analysed in context of a whole (Leveson, 2011). Focusing on one property or aspect of shipping
and during accident investigation or safety analysis may be ineffective if not counter-productive
in improving safety. Therefore, after considering all the facets of shipping (owner, mission, design,
crewing and conduct of shipping operation) as a whole in the shipping context it is necessary to
discuss some emerging themes.

It should also be noted that Navy, Coast Guard and Commercial Shipping systems have their
peculiarities and specificities which may make an otherwise good solution in one system
ineffective in the other. The specific context should be considered when discussing and addressing
emergent safety issues. The emerging discussions covered are sea time, promotions and fatigue.

A critical look at safety in systems theory reveals certain instrumental ideas which aid further
understanding. In this concept, accidents are seen as the result of interactions within
components/subsystems, interactions between components/subsystems and interaction between
components and their environment. Additionally, an understanding of operation process and
functions of feedback loops gives a full understanding of causes of accidents. Inappropriate
imposition of constraints is the common cause of all these accidents. Accident events are the
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symptom of inadequate constraints and control. This further supports the concept of safety being
an emergent property of systems.

Fatigue
The discussion concerning fatigue was intricate with varying opinions some of which turned to be
too passionate for academic purposes. Unanimously, fatigue was agreed to be a major cause of
ship accidents and a result of some unscrupulous shipping companies exploiting seafarers. Some
seafarers present during the discussion, indicated that their high levels of fatigue on ships drove
them to stop sailing and pursue administrative jobs; a reason for pursuing MSc in WMU.
Regardless, fatigue is widely known to be a cause of accidents. Fatigue is known to have been a
major human factor cause of the Exxon Valdes disaster (MSC.1/Circ.1598, 2019). The Marine
Accidents Investigation Branch (MAIB) in 2004 studied 66 accident investigation reports and
concluded that ship Masters’ inability to discharge their responsibilities, low watchkeeper manning
levels and fatigue were major causes of ship grounding and collisions (Akhtar & Utne, 2015).

Promotions
Promotion is an essential tool in motivating and ensuring career progression of seafarers. It has an
added advantage of enabling the organization internally develop capability of seafarers and employ
them in positions with more responsibilities. Usually, seafarers have an understanding of
requirements for promotion at employment (usually stated in contract).

Since, employees

(seafarers) are required to satisfy certain requirements (professional capability and performance of
duty); they tend to increase their performance in order to earn promotion at the earliest. The desire
of seafarers to increase their performance and be professional is constructive and helps the
organization attain its mission. However, an uncontrolled desire to impress authorities may lead
to extreme or wrong practices which may be detrimental to the sustenance of the company.

Sea time
Discussions revealed Warships and Coast Guard ships spent lesser periods at sea as compared to
commercial ships. Warships are deemed to be underway from 2 to 4 months per year at the least.
A seafarer serving on such a ship for 5 years would have accumulated between 10 to 20 months at
sea which is inadequate to master the many navigational and safety critical scenarios that could
occur.

120

Appendix 3
Application of Systems Thinking in Research Work

Figure 8: Diagram of application of systems thinking in research. Source:
Researcher.
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Appendix 4

TRANSCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN SIMON CHAPLIN ON 24 APRIL
2019

Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (Model of High-Level Safety)
Serial

Question

1.

Owners.
a.

Answer (Discussion)

Who are the owners of

Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (PNTL) is owned by

PNTL ships?

International Nuclear Services (68.75%), ORANO (12.5%)
and Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC); a
consortium of Japanese nuclear companies (18.75%). It
operates as a subsidiary company of International Nuclear
Services and its fleet is managed by Serco Limited. This
network of owners was due to the need to transport Nuclear
fuels (nuclear fuel and used nuclear fuel) between Japan and
Europe.

Are there any other
interest
parties in ownership of
this ship?

PNTL is a member of the World Nuclear Transport Institute
which has 47 other members, as shown in Figure 1 (WNTI,
2019a). These institutions are interested in the ownership and
regulation of nuclear transport ships worldwide due to the
reputation damage an accident on one nuclear transport ship
could cause to other ships and the entire nuclear fuel cycle. This
is the motivation for operating high safety standards in order to
maintain the reputation of the nuclear clear. Sufficient
resources are made available for the design and construction of
the ships.

2.

Mission.
What is the mission of

The primary purpose of PNTL ships (Organisation) is to

Nuclear transport Ships

provide transport services and not to make money, though I am

(Organisation)?

not in a position to determine if the company is making profit
or loss.
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The ships serve as a critical link in the fuel cycle by providing
transportation of back end materials in the nuclear fuel cycle.
Specifically, they carry spent fuel, Mixed Oxides fuel
assemblies and vitrified high level waste mainly between Japan
and Europe. The International Maritime Organisation’s (Code)
for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and
High Level Wastes in Flasks On Board Ships (INF Code)
regulate these back end materials (PNTL, 2019). These waste
materials are removed from power stations for long term
storage or recovered for re-use. About 96% of the initial energy
in nuclear fuel is re-used (WNTI, 2019b). These Nuclear power
stations provide 16% of the world's electricity (WNTI, 2019c).
A total of 20 million consignments of radioactive materials are
transported around the world yearly (WNA, 2019).
3.

Design of ship.
a.

What

are

the

key

elements in the design of

Importantly, INF ships are classified into three categories:
a.

PNTL ships?

INF 1 is the lowest level and carries radioactive fuel of INF
material up to 4000
terra-becquerel of activity. It could be a cross channel ferry.

b.

INF 2 is restricted to 2 x 106 terra Becquerel and has more
stringent regulations on
the level of radioactivity. INF 2 could be a regular commercial
ship that could carry other cargoes.

c.

INF 3 has no limit on the level of radioactivity involved. INF
3 ships are ships, specifically made to carry radioactive
material.
PNTL ships are constructed and operated according to
international regulations. They comply with regulations such
as SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, MLC, Nuclear regulations
(Orange Book- United Nations Committee of Experts for all
Dangerous goods by all modes of transport, IMDG Code (Class
7) by IMO, SSR6 by IAEA, Nuclear Security (Convention on
physical protection of nuclear materials). SSR6 is, however,
the reference for clarifying any doubts arising from differences
in the use of terminology. The possible interference of
regulations on each other (i.e., safety and security) is taken into
account and a trade-off or balance in established in compliance.
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Though no accidents have occurred (Zero-accident record), the
ship will be able to withstand collisions due to its high standard
of design. The first generation of INF ships had the highest
safety standards ever, though there were no regulations by then.
However, these high safety standards are resource-dependent.
INS sought the highest construction standard to ensure safety
due to the need to gain and retain the public perception of safety
of the ships and the entire Nuclear energy system. Currently,
these safety standards are above and beyond regulation
standards.
In hull construction, the ships have collision bulkheads which
are similar to that of average cargo ship though with some
reinforcement. Extra reinforcement is placed on hatch covers
to provide radiological protection. The ships have extra plating
and high subdivisions with four holds and double hull
construction to give collision protection.

Notably, PNTL ships have reserve buoyancy in 4 hatches,
enabling it to float in a fully flooded condition. This is an
essential factor since water is the best treatment for radioactive
leakage meaning holds could be flooded in case of radioactive
leakage without affecting the buoyancy of the vessel. The ship
has sufficient reserve buoyancy for this purpose and has been
a design feature since the first-generation of vessels.
Another design feature is high redundancy built into most
systems to enable the ship to operate even after damage. These
include:
a.

Twin independent engine rooms.

b.

Independent shafting systems and twin rudders.

c.

Dual navigation and communication systems.

d.

Extensive fire detection and fighting systems.

The ship The ships could operate with one engine room while the other
is shut down for maintenance. These ships also run on low
sulfur fuel oil.
Design plan of ships is approved by UK MCA; who visit
shipbuilding yards to confirm standards of construction of
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PNTL and other nuclear transport ship. Goal-Based Standards
could be used in regulating the construction of these ships
meeting INF Code standards.
Conspicuously, the ships have no deck cranes, which limits the
capability of attackers in simply assessing cargo. Ships are
fitted with transponders to enable echolocation in case of a ship
sinking.
Generally, ships conduct normal operations. Ship conduct
Do PNTL ships conduct

specialized operations when carrying category one cargo

special-to-type

(MOX) requiring higher security levels. In territorial waters of

(specialized) operations,

other states, the security apparatus of the concerned state may

making them different

require special measures; restricting any port entry until PNTL

from other ship types.

vessel enters ports. Highly dependent on security risk analysis
of the territorial state.
Mainly PNTL ships have relatively higher stability and

b.

How different are these

collision protection.

elements from that on
other ships?
Yes, we have access to repair yards just like any other ship on
c.

Do the ships have access

a voyage. Additionally, we do carry some level of spare

to repair yards during

equipment (spare propeller blades) which enables repairs in

voyages.

shipyards along our voyage.
Notwithstanding these, the aim of high redundancy (twin
engines, twin rudders) is to mitigate the effects of damage to
systems that could cripple the entire operation of the ship.

The shipping line has close collaboration with a salvage
d.

Does cargo inhibit the
conduct of operations?

company that would salvage ships or cargo should they sink.
The cargo does not inhibit operations because the ships are
designed to enable the conduct of operations without going into
cargo holds. When necessary to go into a cargo hold cargo,
packaging and safety procedures enable safe entry and
operations in holds. Conceptually, the design of the ship
enables a ship to move cargo safely from one point to the other
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while the package of the cargo is mainly to ensure the safety
and integrity of the radioactive material during transport.
4.

Crew as a whole.
a.

How

is

the

crew

organized as a whole?

The Captain is in absolute command of the ship. The next
senior line of appointments involves Heads of Department for
Deck (Chief Officer), Engine (Chief Engineer) and Catering
Departments who report to the Captain. In each department, the
chain of command filters down.

Security personnel are also integrated into crew and Chain-of
Command. They are led by Chief Inspectors/ Inspectors who
report directly to the Captain. The team has sergeants who are
senior to other junior ranking officers. The Captain is on top of
the overall Command structure and makes final decisions
based on advice by the head of security team and other
departments. The Captain does not do watches but takes the
‘conn’ to conduct high-risk and relatively complicated
maneouvers and emergencies.

b.

How is the crew trained

Voyage specific training starts from the Safety Management

as a whole?

System; which gives safety procedures required as minimum
standards. Two vessel familiarisation sheets are given to every
new crew member; one stating basic safety requirements such
as the location of fire extinguishers and a second list giving
detail requirement on position-specific functions. An example
is deck crew knowing how to operate emergency steering.
Health physics training is also carried out for all crew members
when a ship is carrying cargo.

c.

How

does

this

General drills are conducted departmentally, and wholly with

organization of crew,

the Captain as the overall authority, every week with more

enable the response to

specific drills conducted less frequently. Training for all LSA

emergencies.

and FFA equipment is conducted on a two-month rolling
schedule. SOPEP drills are also done every six months. The
ship is provided with a shipboard marine emergency plan
(SMEP) with flow charts that gives specific functions of the
crew for initial response to various emergencies. Though not
comprehensive, it contains step-wise instructions to enable
clarity of action in urgent situation and prevents the risk of
missing critical steps in the sequence of responding to incidents
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(Initiating INF Code and SOPEP report procedures). These are
part of the ship Safety Management System (SMS). It is
specific to incident situations and taking cargo carried into
consideration.

5.

Individual
a.

crew

members.

Onboard training is conducted as per company operating

How are individual crew

procedures. Crew obtain statutory training (STCW standards)

members trained?

often before joining the company as pertains to other
commercial ships. UK Nautical Institutes conduct this statutory
training with certificates from MCA.

Ship specific training is conducted according to the rank and
department of the crew onboard. Deck officers undergo typespecific training on navigational equipment onboard, which
could be done by a UK College conducting shore-based
equipment training. This training is done during lay-time for
ships while waiting for cargo. Owners also provide cargospecific training.
b.

How are crew members
recruited for the service

Serco Marine Services (PNTL vessel management company)

onboard?

conducts recruitment of crew in addition to taking care of dayto-day management of vessels. Serco advertises through their
websites, manning agencies, and encourages employees to
recommend new employees. Serco gives bonuses to employees
who are required to recommend only persons they can
themselves work with onboard ships. The crew are usually
British or Irish nationals and who work on permanent
contracts. Senior officers are even required to have the
certification and experience of the next senior person.
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6.

Operations of ships at sea.
a.

Which operations do PNTL

Ships usually conduct Coastal and Ocean navigation. Vessel

ships engage in at sea?

security, included armed security, is determined on a voyage
specific basis in line with the Transport Security Plan. The
ships operate a heightened security regime whenever they
transport Category 1 cargo (Mixed Oxide– pellets, plutonium).
However, for passages without Category I cargo through choke
points like the Panama Canal, security personnel are embarked
to protect against unarmed attacks (demonstrators) and gunboat
escorts are used. Security personnel are usually from the UK
Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) and comply with
International Atomic Energy Agency and the UK’s Nuclear
Industries Security Regulations 2003.
Masters usually give security briefs before the voyage aiming
to ensure adequate measures are enforced and to limit the
unauthorized sharing of information.
Moreso, Mixed Oxide transport requires two ships to sail in
tandem which provides mutual protection and serves to
confuse would-be attacked of which particular ship was
carrying the cargo in transport.

b.
c.
d.

Sea time is challenging to accrue due to voyages being far-in
How do your crew maintain

between. Few sailings make it challenging for crew members

and accrue Sea time?

to accumulate sea time to maintain their certificates and also
conduct training and certification for the next level of training.
Therefore the company employs certain measures designed to
give all crew a fair opportunity to accumulate sufficient sea
time. Crew selection for voyages considers crew with the least
sea-time. Deck officers and cadets are required to keep a record
of their sea time. Twice yearly, each ship sails for 10-day
training (familiarisation) voyages around the UK. This gives
the opportunity to test all equipment, rectify shortcomings,
train crew (anchoring practice for each deck vessels acting as
the Captain, SAR exercises, Manoverboard exercises), and
enable staff to claim voyage sea time based on the 10-day
voyage. Additionally, the crew is divided into a standby and
sailing crew which usually spends up to three months at sea or
off sea duties. However, this is occasionally seen as
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insufficient, causing junior officers to leave the company
despite the benefits of working on these ships.

An alternative and more effective solution to insufficient sea
time is loaning crew out to other companies with high sailing
frequencies. This is specific to deck officers since engineers do
not need sea time. Engineers can keep their knowledge base
current while the ship is in port. Serco (who operated ferries,
Royal Navy support vessels) and British Antarctic Survey
vessels are places where the crew is loaned. However, this
could lead to the poaching of the crew by other companies.
Notwithstanding, the crew may be assigned to other jobs aside
from ship duties. The crew may be assigned to INS as marine
advisors or to ship the management office.

e.

What are the main voyage or

Our main transport route runs Europe-Japan. Occasionally, we

transport routes?

operate trans-Atlantic routes (Med to US), Japan to US,
Australia to UK, UK Coastal waters, and European routes.

f.

What

could

negatively

Most conditions or causes which could negatively impact the

impact the operation of the

operational safety of the vessels have been addressed.

vessel?

However, the vessels could become un-operational in the
situation where the vessels are operated over long periods
without adequate spare parts (possibly due to the manufacturer
no longer fully supporting certain equipment). Currently,
PNTL ships have an average age of 10 years and could last
another 15 years before being decommissioned. Regardless of
age, these vessels are managed according to top class safety
standards.
Ships are usually fully crewed, making it theoretically ready to
sail at any time. However, issues with bunkering and crew
falling sick and going off for other reasons make this difficult
sometimes.
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EMERGENT
DISCUSSIONS
7.

Management

involvement in safety.
a.

Is top management involved

Top management is deeply involved in ship safety

in ship safety standards and

management and continuously reminds the ship crew of safety

operations?

standards. Ships have a safety code requiring the reporting of
near-misses and similar issues. Serco, as the ship Manager,
monitors near-miss reports. They monitor the number and
analyze the causes in order to take appropriate corrective
actions. Serco expects ship Masters to lead in safety issues and
keep the momentum on safety issues high. INS is also involved
in ship safety in order to ascertain ships are reliable for nuclear
transport without causing accidents, which may result in bad
publicity for the nuclear transport system. Stakeholders have
regular safety meetings, held close to the port in order to have
direct inputs from ship's crew on safety matters.

Owners/ Managers want to know near-miss reporting is done
b.

What is the reaction of top

correctly and receive feedback from lessons learned in near

management/ operators to

misses. All crew are trained in near-miss reporting. The

near-miss or non-compliance

Managers Office collects information, analyses, and circulates

reports?

the information and findings among the ships. Trends are
generally easy to determine and discuss during safety
committee meetings. Safety and near misses are thoroughly
discussed during these meetings, and remedies to trends are
feedback into the system to enable improvement of safety.

Top management tries to be positive and maintain a no-blame
culture. This is challenging since there is a need to highlight
when an individual has erred. Therefore this is better referred
to as a Just-culture and not blame-culture.
Everyone is encouraged to participate in the development of
c.

Do crew participates in the

safety culture. This is done subtly and not forced on crew to

development

enable willing and effective participation. The Master leads by

of

safety

culture and issues on ships?

example with the hope of making crew emulate his/her lead.
The Master is allowed a diversion from passage route for safety
reasons such as bad weather or other factors. A decision by a
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Master to divert course is usually not challenged and seen as
good safety or administrative practice.
A proposal for passage is sent to the ship. The crew analyses
the proposal and plans for passage by checking the readiness
of the ship.

Yes, enough resources are given to Masters. There are regular
meetings between the Masters’ and Managers to agree what
d.

Are Masters given enough

resources should be provided. The Managers must strike a

resources to ensure correct

balance between what resources are needed for safety

safety levels?

management and what is requested.

There is a pre-sailing safety inspection, testing, and basic

a.

8. Role of Regulators.

training in the use of all systems onboard the ship. This

What is the role of regulators

involves all crew and owner representatives who come to

in the safety culture?

certify all is well.

Failure of an MCA audits may include invoking of Code 17,
b.

What is the implication of a

which will require the ship to be stopped from sailing. They

ship failing an audit?

could also give a deadline for repairs of corrections to be
effected in order to enable ships to return to sea.

For UK registered vessels, and accident in the UK, accident
b.

What

happens

accident?

after

an

investigations would be conducted by the Marine Accident
Investigation Branch (MAIB) for the UK Maritime regulator
(MCA). Other States may also investigate (such as if the
accident occurred in their territory). The nature of an
investigation would also depend on whether the accident
involved nuclear/radioactive material and if there was a release
of radioactive material.
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Figure 9: Forty-Eight members of the World Nuclear Transport Institute.
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Appendix 5

Interview/Focus Group Consent Form
Research topic: Exploratory study on using system thinking to analyse Navy/Coast Guard
/Commercial Shipping safety in ship operation

Date of interview/group work: 28 March 2019
Expected duration:
Name of participant:
Name of researcher: Seth Anthony Dzakpasu

Dear Ms/Mr.
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview/focus group, which is carried out in
connection with a research project which will be conducted by the interviewer, in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Maritime affairs at the World Maritime
University in Malmo, Sweden.
This consent form intends to ensure that you understand the purpose of your involvement and that
you agree to the conditions of your participation.








Your interview will be recorded (if you agree) and notes will be taken during the meeting.
From the interview, there will be a transcript of main points retained by the researcher.
The transcript will be sent to you to provide you with the opportunity to correct any
factual errors.
The transcript will be analyzed by the researcher to support the investigation.
The access to the transcript will be limited to researchers and academics involved in the
research.
The information provided will be used for research purposes and will form part of a
research reports or/and academic papers as well as eventually in presentations.
Any extract or quotation of the interview used for publicly available publication will be
anonymized.

Moreover, you have the right to stop the interview or withdraw from the research at any time, and
your personal data will be immediately deleted on your request.
Anonymized research data will be archived on a secure drive linked to a World Maritime
University email address. All the data will be deleted after completion of the research.
Your participation in the interview is highly appreciated.
Student’s name
Specialization
Email address

Seth Anthony Dzakpasu
Maritime Safety & Environmental Administration
w1802820@wmu.se
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***
Quotation agreement

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I consent to my interview, as outlined above, being used for this study. I understand that all
personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the strictest confidence.
I also understand that my words may be quoted directly. With regards to being quoted, please
initial next to any of the statements that you agree with:
I wish to review the notes, transcripts, or other data collected during the research
pertaining to my participation.
I agree to be quoted directly.
I agree to be quoted directly if my name is not published and a made-up name
(pseudonym) is used.
I agree that the researchers may publish documents that contain quotations by me.
By signing this agreement, I agree that;
I am voluntarily participating in this research project and I can stop the interview at any time;
The transcribed interview or extracts from it may be used as described above;
I have read the Information sheet;
I can request a copy of the transcript of my interview and may make edits;
I am free to ask any questions I wish to researchers and to contact them in the future.
Name:

………………………………………………………………………

Signature:

………………………………………………………………………

Date:

………………………………………………………………………

Contact Information
This research has been approved under WMU Ethics. For additional questions or concerns, please
contact:
Student’s name
Specialization
Email address

Seth Anthony Dzakpasu
Maritime Safety & Environmental Administration
w1802820@wmu.se

You can also contact research supervisor
Supervisor’s name
Position
Email address

Dr. Raphael Baumler
Associate Professor
rb@wmu.se
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